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Owen: Environmental Justice

ARTICLE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES
REASESSMENT UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE,
TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
By KENNETH OWEN·

Pursuing environmental justice is merely advocating social justice in a socio-physical context-the community biosphere. I

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of "environmental justice" requires "the fair
treatment of all races, cultures, incomes arid educational levels
with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies," with
"fair treatment 'implying' that no subgroup of people should be
forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative en•

LL.M. Environmental Law, Golden Gate University School of law, 1999; J.D.,
Oakland College of Law, 1998. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and assistance provided by Professors Alan Ramo, Clifford Rechtschaffen and
Anne Eng, and by the Golden Gate University Law Review staff, especially Lisa Braly.
1
Alan Ramo, Director, LL.M. in Environmental Law Program, Golden Gate University School of Law.

379

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2

380 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3
vironmental impacts of pollution or environmental hazards due
to lack of political or economic strength.,,2 The few reported
federal cases that have alleged discrimination in environmental justice siting situations under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been unsuccessful
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove intentional or
purposeful discrimination. 3 Communities of color burdened by
environmental hazards then sought judicial relief under Title
VI, section 601, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" Again, however, the courts required plaintiffs to prove purposeful discrimination. 6
.
This requirement has proven to be a formidable barrier to
successful environmental litigation. Although the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on whether a private cause of action can
proceed under the regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI,
Section 602,6 which say that minority plaintiffs needed only to
prove disparate impact to prevail, 7 the administrative complaints filed under the regulations have been unsuccessful. S
Even lawsuits filed under other federal statutes, such as the
Clean Water Act, have become more difficult because the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs, including minority communities, cannot assert standing under the environmental
statutes for wholly past violations. 9 Communities of color will
2

Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response Envtl. Justice Task Force, U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, Draft; Final Report 17 (1994).
3

.

.

See generally RI.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd wlthout
opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. MaconBibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896
F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F.
Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
• Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (West 1999).
6 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).

6 See Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), l1acated, 524 U.S. 974
(1998).
7

See 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (West 1999).

s

See Angela Rowen, EPA MIA, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, June 10, 1998
al1ailable at <http://www.sibg.com/Newsl3213610nGuardlindex.html >.
9

See Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
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thus continue to suffer from environmental injustice until advocates can overcome the barriers to proving intentional discrimination.
This article will suggest what is required to prevail under
the purposeful discrimination standard under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Interestingly, no equal protection environmental justice case or
Title VI action has been presented to a jury charged with determining the factual issue of intent. The author will next explore the possibility of winning environmental justice cases
under the citizen suit provisions that are part of most environmental statutes. Lastly, the author will suggest arguments
to possible defenses that might be raised by defendants.
II. PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

A

INGENERAL

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. ,,10 This guarantee of equal protection applies to actions by both state arid local governments. 11 Federal
governments are also bound by equal protection principles;
however, the federal guarantee of equal protection comes from
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment's
12
Due Process Clause. While the Equal Protection Clause does
not apply to "merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful," a private party involved in a conspiracy with a
government official can be held liable under civil rights statutes for violating the Equal Protection Clause. IS "It is enough

10
11

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173 (1970).

12 See
IS

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).

Adiekes, 398 U.S. at 169. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,

172 (1972).
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that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State
or its agents. ,,14
The Equal Protection Clause imposes a general restraint on
the governmental use of classifications, such as race, gender,
alienage, illegitimacy, wealth, or any other characteristic. To
the use of these classifications, a plaintiff can make two types
of challenges. The first type of challenge is that the statute or
regulation violates equal protection "on its face," meaning that
15
the classification is written into the statute or regulation. The
second type of equal protection challenge is "as applied" and is
used if the statute or regulation is valid on its face, yet is being
administered in a purposefully discriminatory way.lS Most
challenges to governmental decisions with regard to environmental justice concerns will be of this second type.
In any challenge, a court will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review to any classification that relates to a suspect
17
classification. Such classifications include race, national origin, and sometimes alienage. IS Because the environmental justice movement, in general, is concerned with governmental
action that unfairly affects people of color, the equal protection
environmental justice claims will typically require a strict
19
scrutiny standard of review. Under the standard, the classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.20 Significantly, the burden is

14

Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
(1966».
15

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-192 (1976); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880).
16
17
18

See Williams v. Dlinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

19

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964».
20

.

See McLaughlm, 379 U.S. at 192.
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upon the governmental body to persuade the court that this
21
classification does so and is thus constitutional.
Strict scrutiny of a suspect classification will only be ap22
plied where the government action is intentional. AB the
United States Supreme Court has said, "[p]urposeful racial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of adverse differential treatment. Absent such purpose, differential impact is
subject only to the test ofrationality.,,23 Consequently, action by
the government that produces a disparate impact, without a
showing of intentional discrimination, does not create a suspect class, and consequently, strict scrutiny is unavailable.
B. PROVING PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION
If the law discriminates on its face, no showing of purpose-

ful discrimination is necessary because "[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.,,2' Similarly, if the law is neutral on its face and yet is applied in an invidiously discriminatory manner, statistical proof
alone is sufficient to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
2lI
Clause. The most difficult cases to prove then are where the
law is racially neutral on its face and ostensibly applied in accordance with its terms, yet the governmental action results in

21 See Washington, 426 U.S. at 241 (1976). "With a prima facie case made out, 'the
burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action
by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have
produced the monochromatic result.' .. ld. (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972».
22
See Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 18 n.8. "Strict scrutiny ofa classification affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where a plaintiff can show
intentional discrimination by the Government." ld. (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at
239-245).

23

Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,6170.5 (1982) (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at
247-48). See also Wisconsin, 517 U.S. at 18 n.8.
~

.

Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (quoting
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184).
211

See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
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a disparate impact. In such cases, to prove that the disparate
impact, or effect, of the government action is the result of purposeful discrimination requires resort to circumstantial evidence.26
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis 27 explicitly required that plaintiffs prove an intent to discriminate
in order to establish an equal protection violation.28 In Washington' the plaintiffs had failed a written test to determine
whether they had acquired the specific level of verbal ability
and reading comprehension necessary to become a police offi29
cer in the District of Columbia. They, as black applicants
failed, since blacks failed the test four times as frequently as
whites. so The plaintiffs asserted that this differential impact
constituted an equal protection violation even though those
who composed the test had no intent to discriminate against
31
blacks. The Supreme Court held that .a neutral law does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact; instead, the disproportionate impact must be traced to an intent to discriminate on the
. 0 f race. 32
baSIs
The Washington plaintiffs might have been successful if
they had filed a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Washington Court conceded that under Title VII,
"employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern
themselves with the employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential
impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices."as The

26

See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977).
27

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

28 See id.
29

See id. at 233.34.

so See id. at 230.
id.

31See
32

See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).

33 [d.

at 238.39.
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Court, however, refused to establish a disparate impact standard for the Equal Protection Clause, reasoning that "[w]e
have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to
the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do
so today.,,34 The logic behind requiring the higher standard for
proving intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause appears to be that government actions, held merely to a
disparate impact standard, "would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the
average black than to the more affluent white.,,36 Despite this
reluctance, the purposeful discrimination requirement of
Washington has thus far been extended to such areas as jury
selection,36 zoning and public housing,37 and voting rights. 36
C. ARLINGTON HEIGHTS ELEMENTS OF PuRPOSEFUL
DISCRIMINATION

The
Washington
Court
further
observed
that
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution.,,39 One year later, in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,40 the Supreme Court recognized its importance in that "[t]he impact of
the official action - - whether it 'bears more heavily on one race
than another' - - may provide an important starting point."'1
Arlington Heights also said that in addition to an initial

34

36

Id. at 239.
Id. at 248.

36 See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
37 See generally Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252.
3B
39
40
41

See generally Rogers, 458 U.S. 613.
.

.

Washlngton, 426 U.S. at 242.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).

Id. at 266.
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showing of disproportionate impact, circumstantial evidence is
required to prove discriminatory intent. 42 Such circumstantial
evidence includes four elements to consider. First, the court
should consider the historical background of the decision that
might reveal a series or pattern of government action taken for
invidious purposes. 43 A second consideration is the specific se44
quence of events immediately preceding the action. A third
are any departures, substantive or procedural, from the ordinary decision-making process and a fourth is the legislative or
administrative history, such as contemporary statements by
members of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings,
or reports. 46
1. Statistical Evidence of Disparate Impact

Prevailing under the Arlington Heights standard is not impossible, but it does require a clear understanding of each
component of the inquiry. Statistics are the starting point of
any successful equal protection challenge and, in rare cases,
statistics alone can prove intentional discrimination. "Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.,,46 In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins,47 for example, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under a municipal ordinance, which was "fair on its
face and impartial in appearance.,,46 Yick Wo involved a San
Francisco ordinance requiring that all laundries housed in
9
wooden buildings be licensed before operating: Yick Wo, a
Chinese citizen, applied for and was refused permission to operate his laundry, and was thereafter convicted of a violation of

42

See id.

43

See id. at 267.

44

See id.

46
46

See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.

47
48

49

[d. at 266.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).

[d. at 373.

See id. at 357.
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the ordinance and sentenced to imprisonment. 50 The Board of
Supervisors of San Francisco granted all but one of the eighty
non-Chinese applicants and denied all two hundred Chinese
applicants. 61 The Court held:
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it
is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason
for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to
which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is
not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the
public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, and a violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the constitution. 62
In Yick Wo, the disparate impact by itself was sufficient to
prove invidious discrimination.53 Similarly, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,64 an Alabama statute changed the city boundaries
from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure, allegedly removing "all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not
removing a single white voter or resident.,,66 The effect of Alabama's redefining the city boundaries clearly discriminated
against blacks; before the change they had had constituted
forty percent of the registered voters, after they accounted for
only a percent or two of the new city.1i6 "[T]he Court concluded
that the redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries left no doubt that the plan was designed to exclude
blacks. ,,67
Cases such as Yick Wo and Gomillion, however, are rare.
"Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo,

50

See id. at 358.

61 See id. at 359-360.
62

Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.

53

See id.

64

364 U.S. 339 (1960).

56
57

See id. at 348.

66 ld. at 34l.

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U .. S. 900, 913 (1995).
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impact alone is not determinative and the Court must look to
other evidence.,,58 The point at which this must be done is still
unclear as the Court has drawn no bright line. In Washington
v. Davis, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion observed that
"the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."I59 Thus,
the advocate should look for statistics that approach the standard established in Yick Wo and Gomillion as that would end
the inquiry. The closer the statistical impact approaches Yick
Wo and Gomillion, the less need for other circumstantial evidence to prove intent.
In several jury-selection cases, however, the Court has
found a constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern did not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion.60
In Turner v. Fouche,61 cited by the Court in Arlington Heights,
the Court recognized:
The undisputed fact was that Negroes composed only 37%
of the Taliaferro County citizens on the 304-member list from
which the new grand jury was drawn. That figure contrasts
sharply with the representation that their percentage (60%) of
the general Taliaferro County population would have led them
to obtain in a random selection.62
From this evidence, the Court held that appellants had
made out their prima facie case of jury discrimination because
they could show both a substantial disparity between the percentages of Negro residents and those on the new jury list and
that the disparity initiated, at least in part, during a portion of
the selection process where the jury commissioners invoked

58 Arlington
59

Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.

Washington, 426 U.S. at 254.

60

61
62

See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.13.
.

396 U.S. 346 (1970).

[d. at 359.
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63

their subjective judgment. Turner thus stands for the fact
that a substantial disparity, that is, a participation reduction
from sixty percent to thirty-seven percent, is sufficient for a
prima facie showing. While this is a long way from the one
hundred percent reduction demonstrated by Yick Wo, the advocate must still show a disparate impact.
Generally, in environmental justice cases, census tracts or
zip codes have been utilized for demonstrating disparate impact. While these methods have been helpful, more sophisticated approaches could be more effective at showing disparate
impact. For example, the district court in Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management COrp.64 found useful the plaintiffs' defini65
tion of "minority" and "Anglo" census tracts. The plaintiffs
suggested that since the city of Houston's population is thirtynine percent minority and sixty-one percent Anglo, then a minority census tract is one with more than thirty-nine percent
minority population and Anglo census tracts are those with
66
more than sixty-one percent Anglo population. Interestingly,
the court suggested that "[i]t may be that more particularized
data would show that even those sites approved in predominantly Anglo census tracts were actually located in minority
neighborhoods, but the data available here does not show
that.,,87 The court concluded that if the solid waste sites were
located next to minority communities in predominantly Anglo
census tracts, "the outcome of this case would be quite different. ~ The case might also have been different depending on
the size of the area affected by a solid waste site. "If it affects a
smaller area than the census tract, it becomes particularly important to know where in each census tract the site is located.
If it affects a larger area than the census tract, then a target

63

.

See id. at 360.

64 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.
1986).
65

66
67
68

•

See id. at 677.
•

See id. at 679.

Id. at 677.
Id. at 680.
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area of analysis becomes much more persuasive.',69 Consequently, statistics, and the way they are presented, can have a
significant impact on the outcome of an environmental justice
equal protection case.
2. Historical Background of the Decision

Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can be sufficiently supplemented by the types of proof outlined in Arlington Heights. For instance, in Griffin v. County School Board Of
Prince Edward CO.,70 a group of Negro children sued the
County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia in
1951, alleging that they had been denied admission to public
schools attended by white children. 71 In 1954, the Supreme
Court held that the Virginia segregation laws denied equal
protection to the Negro children and ordered the school board
to desegregate. 72 The board, instead, closed its public schools. 73
Since the private schools, supported by state and local tuition
grants and tax credits, were operated only for whites, Negro
children could not attend school. 74 In 1964, the Supreme Court
was finally able to put an end to the legal maneuvering by the
state of Virginia by holding that closing the public schools also
denied blacks equal protection. 76 This case thus illustrates that
a historical pattern showing invidious discrimination of "resistance at the state and county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits," can circumstantially prove discriminatory intent. 76
Likewise, Davis v. Schnelln shows that the historical background can prove discriminatory intent. In Davis, ten Negro
69
70

71

Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 680.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
See ill. at 220.
ill.

72See
73

See id.

74

See ill. at 222.23.

76 See
76

Griffen, 377 U.S. at 232.

[d. at 229.

77

81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.Ala. 1949), affd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
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citizens of Mobile County, Alabama challenged the validity of
an Amendment to the Alabama Constitution, which required
that only those persons who could understand and explain any
article of the Federal Constitution could be registered as electors in Alabama elections. 78 The plaintiffs alleged that the
amendment was intended to prevent black citizens from exercising their right to vote. 79 The district court took judicial notice of the history of the period immediately preceding the
adoption of the amendment to support its conclusion that the
amendment violated the equal protection clause.so
Yet another example lies within Keyes v. School District No.
1. Denver. Colorado. 81 On the issue of segregative intent, the
Court recognized that "a finding of intentional segregation as
to a portion of a school system is not devoid of probative value
in assessing the school authorities' intent with respect to other
parts of the same school system.,,82 Indeed, when the case involves a single school board, it is highly relevant since "the
prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of a
scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possibility that the act
in question was done with innocent intent."ss
Such "prior doings," if able to develop into a pattern establishes "a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the
part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions.,,84 Advocates thus should look for a historical pattern of
discrimination in equal protection environmental justice cases
to supplement the statistical evidence of disparate impact.

78

79

See id. at 874.
S ee id.

so See id. at 878, 880.
81

413 U.S. 189 (1973).

82

[d. at 207.
83 [d.

84

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
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3. Specific Sequence of Events

Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be
supplemented by the specific sequence of events immediately
preceding the action. 85 For example, in Arlington Heights, the
plaintiff attacked the village's refusal to rezone land from single-family to multiple-family, a rezoning that would have al86
lowed construction of low-income integrated housing. While
the Court held that the Village's refusal did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, it also suggested that if the property
had always been zoned for multiple-family use, but had then
been changed to single-family classification when the integrated project was proposed, "we would have a far different
case."s7
4. Departures from Normal Procedures

Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be
supplemented by departures from the normal procedural sequence, such as, for example the elimination of public hearings
on the siting of a solid waste facility. In addition to procedural
departures, substantive ones are also relevant, "particularly if
the factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached."ss In Dailey v. City of Lawton,89 for example, the plaintiffs purchased a
former school site in a predominantly white residential neigh90
borhood and planned to build low-income housing on the site.
The plaintiffs applied to the planning commission for the required zone change, which was objected to by a petition signed
by about 250 white neighbors. 91 The planning commission then
refused to rezone the land even though the surrounding area

85

See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.

86 See

ill. at 254-55.

87

I d.

88

Id.

89

425 F.2d 1037 (lOth Cir. 1970).

90

See id. at 1038.
ill.

91See
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was zoned high density and that both the present and former
director testified that from a zoning standpoint there was no
reason why the school site should not be rezoned high
density.92 From this evidence, the Court found there to be a
sufficient showing "that the public bodies acted as they did because of the opposition to the project by the residents of the
North Addition.''''3 Thus, "the record sustain[ed] the holding of
racial motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and of [section]
1983.,,94

5. Legislative or Administrative History
Statistical evidence of discriminatory impact can also be
supplemented by the legislative or administrative history, "especially where there are contemporary statements by members
of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, or reportS.""6 Consequently, advocates should inquire into the legislative history of the statute or regulation for any evidence of
racial prejudice. No matter how much time has elapsed, a provision will continue to be a violation of equal protection so long
as it has a discriminatory impact. 96
D. BEYOND ARLINGTON HEIGHTS

Significantly, Arlington Heights provides a five part inquiry
into the types of evidence that might support a prima facie
showing of discriminatory intent.97 This inquiry, however, was
not meant to be exhaustive; twenty years after Arlington
Heights, the Supreme Court in Reno v. Bossier Parish School

92 See id.
.
93 Id. at 1039.
94

.

Dalley. 425 F.2d at 1040.

95 Arlington
96

Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.

See Keyes. 413 U.S. at 210-11. See also Hunter v. Underwood. 471 U.S. 222, 22930 (1985).

97 See id. at 268.
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98

Board has continued to advise courts to look to the Arlington
Heights framework for guidance in "examining discriminatory
purpose in cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause.,,99

Once a prima facie case of intentional discrimination is established, the state must rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that it use racially neutral criteria
and procedures. 100 This burden can prove difficult for defen101
dants as Turner v. Fouche illustrated. There, the state failed
to prove that it had "included or excluded no one because of
race."102 Similarly, in Keyes, the Court held that it was insufficient for the state to rely on "some allegedly logical, racially
neutral explanation for their actions. "103 Instead, their burden
was to prove that "segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions."l04 Additionally, in Dailey,
the Court held that plaintiffs' prima facie case "must be met by
something more than bald, conclusory assertions that the action was taken for other than discriminatory reasons. "105 This
burden requires the defendant to show that the governmental
action would have occurred anyway, even without the discriminatory intent. 106 If the state could establish that it would
have taken the same action despite a discriminatory motive,
the plaintiff could no longer claim that the state improperly
considered race and the defendant would have satisfied the
burden of proof. 107

98

. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
99

[d. at 488.

100 See Washington, 426 U.S. ~t 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, 632). See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
101 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
102 [d. at 360-61.
103 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210.
104 [d.
105 Dailey, 425 F.2d at 1039-40.
106
See w.
107 See Arlington Heights,

429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
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Although the Arlington Heights five-part inquiry is useful,
there is not a bright-line test for proving discriminatory purpose. The Court did, however, began to develop a more precise
definition of intentional discrimination in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.los In this case, Feeney, a
woman and nonveteran, challenged a Massachusetts statute
that gave veterans an "absolute lifetime" preference for consideration for state civil service jobs as discriminatory against
women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 109 Although
she had passed a number of open competition civil service examinations for better jobs, because of the preference statute,
she was ranked in each instance lower than male veterans who
had achieved lower test scores than herself; ninety-eight per110
cent of veterans were male. Although the Court observed
that "[t]he enlistment policies of the Armed Services may well
have discriminate[ed] on the basis of sex,,,111it nevertheless
held that "when the totality of the legislative actions establishing and extending the Massachusetts veterans' preference
are considered, the law remains what it purports to be: a preference for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex,
not for men over women. ,,112 The C9urt thus concluded that
while the substantial edge granted to veterans may reflect an
unwise policy, Feeney "ha[d] simply failed to demonstrate that
the law in any way reflect[ed] a purpose to discriminate on the
. 0 f sex. ,,113
baSIs

Feeney is significant in clarifying and distinguishing the
presumption that a person intends the natural and foreseeable
consequences of his voluntary actions. 114 Specifically, the Court
declared that while it would be inaccurate to state that the
impact on women was unintentional because they were fore-

lOS

442 u.S. 256 (1979).

109 See
110

id. at 259.

See id. at 264, 269-70.

111 Id. at 278.
112 Id.
113

at 280 (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 2(2).

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281.
id.

114 See
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seeable, equal protection requires the plaintiff to prove that
the action was taken precisely because of, not in spite of, the
discriminatory impact. ll5 The Court's clarification of intent
thus reaffirmed and added to the Arlington Heights framework
for guidance in determining whether a particular act was motivated by discriminatory animus. ll6 More significantly, the
Court reaffirmed the notion that when governmental action
has a disparate impact on a group, "a strong inference that the
adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.,,117 The
Court cautioned, however, that this inference is a tool, not
proof of discriminatory intent. ll6 Since the impact here was
unavoidable, the policy favoring veterans was legitimate, and
there was no evidence demonstrating discriminatory intent,
the inference was not helpful to the plaintiffs. ll9
120

Rogers v. Lodge further elaborated on the meaning of intent under the equal protection clause. In Rogers, the plaintiffs
argued that the at-large election system for Burke County,
Georgia violated the Equal Protection Clause because it di121
luted the voting strength of the minority population. According to the 1980 census, the population of Burke County
was fifty-four percent black; however, blacks constituted only
thirty-eight percent of the registered voters.l22 As a result, "[n]o
Negro ha[d] ever been elected to the Burke County Board of
Commissioners. ,,123 From these facts and from the district
court's inquiry into the "ability of blacks to participate effectively in the political process,,,I24 the Court affirmed the district

ll5 See id. at 278-79 (quoting United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179 (1977)
(concurring opinion».
ll6
ll7

See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 488 (1997).

ll9

See id.

120

458 U.S. 613 (1982).

121

See id. at 616-71.

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.
ll8 See id.

122 See id. at 615.
123 [d.

124 [d. at 624.
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court's conclusion that "historical discrimination had restricted
the present opportunity of blacks effectively to participate in
the political process."l25 Additionally, the Court held that although the election method was 'racially neutral when
adopted, [it was] being maintained for invidious purposes"l28
and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. As Rogers illustrates, an additional element that an advocate should inquire into is the due process afforded to communities of color
with regard to any governmental action. Examples of important topics to question are whether the process provides them
with notice of public meetings of the government action,
whether communities of color can participate in the proceedings, and whether the advocates are allowed to present evidence on behalf of the minority communities. The answer to
these questions can add to the totality of relevant facts necessary to prove intent.
In Rogers v. Lodge, the law was racially neutrai when

adopted; conversely, in Hunter v. Underwood/ 27 the adoption of
a law in 1901, although racially neutral on its face, was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of
race. l28 Per this law, which disenfranchised persons convicted
of any crime, including misdemeanors, involving moral turpitude, the plaintiffs, one black and one white, were blocked
from the voter rolls because they had each been convicted of
the misdemeanor of cashing a bad check. l29 In blocking the
plaintiffs, the Board of Registrars relied on opinions of the At-

125 Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625. In affirming the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court recognized that the district court applied the proper test
outlined in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights:
. Although both cases -rejected the notion that a law is invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater portion of one race than another ... both cases recognized that discriminatory intent need not be proven by direct evidence. 'Necessarily, an
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law
bears more heavily on one race than another.' .. [d. at 618.
126 [d. at 616 (emphasis in original).
127471

U.S. 222 (1985).

128 See id. at 230.
129 See id. at 224.
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torney General, which held that the misdemeanor of cashing a
bad check was a crime involving moral turpitude. lso Interestingly, arguably more serious crimes, such as second-degree
manslaughter, assault on a police officer, and mailing pornography, were not considered crimes involving moral turpitude. lsl
Nevertheless, as a result of this law, blacks were disenfranchised approximately ten times more than whites and had
done so from its inception. ls2 While the counsel for the government defendants conceded that race was a factor in adopting the law, they argued that the purpose of the law was to
disfranchise poor people, blacks and whites alike and that this
motive was permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. 183
The Court, however, held that while the law may have been
adopted to discriminate against poor people, it would not negate the fact that the state intended to discriminate against all
blacks. l84 A mixed motive, therefore, did not immunize the governmental action from an equal protection challenge. lso Consequently, once the plaintiffs proved that racial discrimination
was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the law, defendants had to demonstrate that the law would have been
enacted anyway.1SO Here, because the evidence clearly showed
that, in 1901, the motivation for the provision in the Alabama
Constitution was to discriminate against blacks, the law was
unconstitutional.
E. EQUAL PROTECTION ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASES

Within this Arlington Heights framework, the plaintiffs in
the three reported federal equal protection environmental jus-

IS0 S

ee ill.

131 See ill. at 227.
IS2

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227.

183 See ill. at 230.
ill. at 232.
185 See ill.

184 See

136 See

ill. at 228.
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137
tice cases were unable to prove intentional discrimination.
Nevertheless, much can be learned from these cases and an
advocate for the environmental justice movement should not ,be
discouraged from pursuing an equal protection case if the evidence supports a cause of action. For example, in Bean v.
Southwestern Waste Management COrp.,t38 the Texas Department of Health ("TDH") granted a permit to defendant Southwestern Waste Management to operate a solid waste facility in
a minority community.139 In response, the plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction against the decision as being racially
14O
discriminatory in violation of their civil rights. To obtain a
preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs must, among other
things, show a substantial likelihood of success on the
141
merits. The plaintiffs, however, failed to do so because the
statistical data they offered did not rise to the level of discriminatory intent.142 Further, plaintiffs' assertion of a discriminatory pattern or practice in the placement of solid waste
sites was similarly unavailing. l43 Accordingly, the plaintiffs
could not prove discriminatory intent. 144
Regarding the plaintiffs' second theory of liability, which
was that "TDH's approval of the permit, in the context of the
historical placement of solid waste sites and the events surrounding the application, constituted discrimination," the court
found that the statistical evidence, although not focused on
TDH's actions so much as the historical trend, still failed un-

137 See generally R.I.S.E. Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd with·
out opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Macon·Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989),
affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,
482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
138

139

482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).

See id. at 675.
id.
141 See id. at 676.
140 See

142

143

See id. at 677.
See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677.

144 See id.
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der close scrutiny.145 The court was persuaded by the Assistant
Attorney General's argument that the historical placement of
sites in the eastern half of the city was "because that is where
Houston's industry is, not because that is where Houston's minority population is.,,146 This reasoning, however, while sufficient for the district court at the time, might not hold up under
the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Hunter v. Underwood,147 where the Court held that the presence of the second,
non-discriminatory motive, would not immunize the governmental action from an equal protection challenge.
Even though it ruled against the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, the district court in Bean was sympathetic to the plaintiffs' situation and said that if it were TDH it
might have not granted the permit. l48 This was because "[i]t
simply does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to
a high school, particularly one with no air conditioning. Nor
does it make sense to put the land site so close to a residential
neighborhood. ,,149 The court then noted that "[t]he failure of the
plaintiffs to obtain a preliminary injunction does not, of course,
mean that they are foreclosed from obtaining permanent relief
. .. . assuming the case goes forward, discovery could lead to
much more solid and persuasive evidence for either side." 150
Consequently, the court also denied TDH's motion to dismiss
the complaint. l5l
In the second reported equal protection environmental justice case, East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Commission,162 the plaintiffs alleged that the Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Com146 1d. at 678.
146

1d. at 679.

147 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
148

Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679.

149 1d. at 679-80.
160 1d. at 680.

151 See id. at 681.
162 706 F. Supp 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th eir. 1989).
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mission's ("Commission") decision to allow the creation of a
private waste landfill in a minority census tract was motivated
in part by considerations of race in violation of their equal pro163
tection rights. Following extensive discovery by the parties,
the court conducted a non-jury trial and concluded that in light
of the Arlington Heights five part inquiry, "this court is convinced that the Commission's decision to approve the conditional use in question was not motivated by the intent to discriminate against black persons. "154 In support, the court observed that the other landfill approved by the Commission was
in a majority while neighborhood at that this fact disrupted
the asserted patter of discrimination with respect to the loca166
tion of landfills. The district court, erroneously applying the
rather difficult statistical standard established in Yick Wo and
Gomillion, thus concluded that there was not a clear pattern of
166
racially motivated decisions. The court then, rather cursorily,
applied Arlington Heights and concluded that the Commis167
sion's action did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
In the most recently reported federal decision, R.I.S.E. Inc.
v. Kay,166 Virginia plaintiffs challenged a decision of the King
and Queen County Board of Supervisors, which approved a
solid waste landfill site in a predominantly black area of the
169
county, as a violation of their equal protection rights. While
the district court found that "[t]he placement of landfills in
King and Queen County from 1969 to the present has had a
disproportionate impact on black residents," the court concluded that "the plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that
satisfies the remainder of the discriminatory purpose equation

163 See

id. at 88l.

at 884 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
See id.

154 [d.
166
166

.

See id. at 885.

167 See
166

East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp. at 887.

768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.

1992).
169

See id. at 1143 .
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set forth in Arlington Heights."l60 In so holding, the court reasoned, that approving the site of the landfill was based on en161
vironmental factors, not race. This conclusion seems to fly in
the face of the court's own findings of historical facts which
reveal a pattern of official actions taken for invidious purposes.
Specifically, the court first found that the population of King
and Queen County is approximately fifty percent black and
162
fifty percent white.
Second, it found that sixty-four percent
of the blacks live within a half mile radius of the proposed
landfill site and that while twenty-one of the twenty-six families living along the three mile stretch of landfill bound traffic
l63
are black, the other five are white.
Third, the court found
that at the time the Mascot landfill was sited in 1969 and the
population living within a one mile radius of the site was one
l64
hundred percent black.
The court next found that when the
Dahlgren landfill was sited i:t;l 1971, the estimated ninety-five
percent of the population living in the immediate area were
l65
black.
The court's final finding was that not only was the
Owenton landfill was sited in 1977 when an estimated one
hundred percent of the residents living within a half-mile radius of the landfill were black, but that the First Mount Olive
Baptist Church, a black church, was located one mile from the
l66
landfill. These facts alone should have satisfied the Yick Wo
and Gomillion standard because the pattern was "unexplainable on grounds other than race."167 The court, however, was
persuaded by the state's assertion that the approval of the
sites was based on the relative environmental suitability of the
sites. l68 Furthermore, the district court's reasoning seems to
160
161

R.I.S.E. Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp, 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991).
See id. at 1150.

162

See id. at 1148.

163

See R.I.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. at 1148.
id.

164 S ee

S ee id.
166 See id. at 1148.

165

167 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citing Gomillion, 364 U.S. 339; Yick Wo, 118
U.S. 356 (emphasis added).

168

See R.I.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150.
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ignore the Supreme Court's holding in Hunter v. Underwood,
which instructs that even though there could be two purposes
that motivated the governmental action, and yet only one of
these was discriminatory against the suspect class, the presence of the second, non-discriminatory motive would not immunize the governmental action from an equal protection
169
challenge. If such had been followed, the burden of proof
would have then shifted to the defendants who would have had
to show "something more than bald, conclusory assertions that
the action was taken for other than discriminatory reasons. ,,170
In other words, the defendant would have had to show that the
governmental action would have occurred anyway, even without the intent. As this might have been difficult, if the district
court had applied the proper legal standard, the results could
have been different.

F. APPLYING EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES TO
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS

Applying the principles discussed above to a number of hypothetical equal protection environmental justice cases illustrates an effective approach to the challenge posed by proving
discriminatory intent. Because Robert Bullard has observed
that Environmental Justice is concerned with the distribution
of the benefits and burdens of environmental protection, the
author suggests that a benefit versus burden framework is the
best way to analyze environmental equal protection claims171
In such an analysis, the first step is to identify the groups
benefited and burdened by the government action. One method
172
of identification is by census tract data.

169

See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 231.

170

Dailey, 425 F.2d at 1040.

171 See Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States, 18
YALE J. INT'L. L. 319, 334 (1993). Robert Bullard is Ware Professor of Sociology and
Director of the Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University in
Atlanta, Georgia.
172 See FFIEC Geocoding System, (last modified April 22, 1999)
<http://www.ffiec.gov/geocodel>.
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To
illustrate some examples, the hypothetical County of
San Franjustco was chosen. See Figure 1. San Franjustco
County has a total population of 100,000 and is divided into
ten census tracts, A through J, each with a population of
10,000. The total population of San Franjustco County is fifty
percent minority and fifty percent white. Therefore, a minority
census tract is one with more than fifty percent minority
population and a white tract is one with more than fifty percent white population. 173 Accordingly, by definition, Figure 1
indicates that Census Tracts C, D, F, G, and J are minority
census tracts. Conversely, Census Tracts A, B, E, H, and I are
white census tracts.
Example 1

The San Franjustco County Board of Supervisors approves
a solid waste landfill in Census Tract F, a minority census
tract with a minority population of eighty percent. In this case,
only the residents of Census Tract F can use the solid waste
landfill. Thus, the landfill site both benefits and burdens the
entire population of Census Tract F. In this situation, there is
no disparate impact, and consequently no violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because both the minority population
and white population are benefited and burdened equally.
Example 2

The Board of Supervisors approves a solid waste landfill in
Census Tract I, a white census tract with a white population of
seventy percent. As above, only Census Tract F residents can
use the landfill; thus, the site both benefits and burdens the
entire population of Census Tract I. In this situation, there is
no apparent disparate impact. Bean suggests, however, that
more particularized data could indicate that even those sites
approved in predominantly white census tracts were actually
located in minority neighborhoods within the tract. For instance, suppose the thirty percent minority population is 10-

Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679 (applying the court's definition of "minority census
tract" and "Anglo census tract").
173
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cated within one neighborhood of Census Tract I, and the solid
waste landfill is located in the minority neighborhood. In such
circumstances, "a strong inference that the adverse effects
were desired can reasonably be drawn. "174 A showing of disparate impact on the minority neighborhood within the white
census tract would then require supplemental evidence to support a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. An advocate would then be justified in searching for additional circumstantial evidence under the Arlington Heights framework.

Example 3
The Board of Supervisors approves a solid waste landfill in
Census Tract G, a minority census tract with a minority
population of ninety percent. As above, the landfill site both
benefits and burdens the entire population of Census Tract G,
at least initially. The Board of Supervisors, instead of approving a solid waste landfill in Census Tract E, a white census
tract with a white population of ninety percent, approves the
expansion of the solid waste facility in Census Tract G, and
allows the population of Census Tract E to transport its solid
waste to the facility in Census Tract G. The population of Census Tract G is disparately burdened by E's garbage and the
population of Census Tract E is disparately benefited by the
Board's decision. A situation like this comes close to the standard established in Yick Wo and Gomillion. Little, if any, supplemental evidence should be necessary to prove a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination.

Example 4
The Board of Supervisors approves the permits for the construction of two powerplants, which benefit the entire county.
One powerplant is approved for construction in Census Tract
B, a white census tract with a white population of sixty percent, and the other is approved for construction in Census
Tract C, a minority census tract with a minority population of
sixty percent. As East Bibb Twiggs suggests, there is no

174

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2

406 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3
showing of disparate impact, unless the plaintiff can show a
pattern of placing the powerplants in minority neighborhoods
within the census tracts.
The above examples suggest that the starting point of an
equal protection challenge could very well be the ending point.
Clearly, without disparate impact, there is no equal protection
violation. What might appear at first blush to be an environmental justice issue may simply be the only area to site a particular facility. The advocate thus must make an intelligent
assessment of the impact before taking on the case.
G.

SUMMARY

The plaintiffs in the three reported federal equal protection
environmental justice cases, which relied on the Arlington
Heights framework, were unable to prove intentional discrimination. 175 Unfortunately, judges, acting as the fact finder, decided all these cases. It is strongly suggested that had a jury,
especially one composed of a representative minority community, decided the factual issue of discriminatory intent, the results might have been quite different.
III. PuRPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VI OF THE
CML RIGHTS ACT
A. IN GENERAL

Some environmental justice advocates, frustrated by the
discriminatory intent standard under the Equal Protection
Clause, have turned to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
section 601 of which provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-

175 See generally R.l.S.E. Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1141, affd without opinion, 977 F.2d
573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs, 706 F. Supp 880, affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.
1989); Bean, 482 F. Supp. 673, affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
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ceiving Federal financial assistance.,,176 Section 602 authorizes
and directs federal agencies to issue rules and regulations to
177
implement this prohibition. Before these rules and regulations can become effective, however, Presidential approval
17s
must be obtained. Once that is obtained, federal agencies,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), are
authorized to terminate aid to state or local agencies that receive federal funds or to take any other step authorized by
179
law. Before aid may be terminated, however, the head of the
Federal Department or agency must file a written report of the
circumstances and grounds for such action with the committees of the House of Representatives and Senate having legis1so
lative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved. Furthermore, no action becomes effective until thirty days have
1S1
elapsed after the filing of such report. After the thirty days
and after federal aid has been terminated, Section 603 of Title
1s2
VI affords judicial review of agency orders to halt federal aid.
Title VI was "meant to cover only those situations where
federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn,
provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary."l83 In
these situations, funds may be halted or denied for any program or activity defined in section 606 that receives federal
assistance by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty.l84 Thus, when a department or
agency of a state or local government receives federal financial

176

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (West 1999).
177 I d. § 2000d-1.
17S See id.

179 S ee

180

id.

See id.

lSl
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
lS2
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (West 1999).
183 Williams v. Glickman, 931 F. Supp. I, 6 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting Soberal-Perez v.
Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 929 (1984». See also 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (West 1999).
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (West 1999Xadded by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

29

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 2

408 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3

assistance, Title VI coverage extends to all programs or activities, "including those programs and activities that are not
EPA-funded."l86 "Program or activity" is defined as "all of the
operations of a state department or agency, not just the specific program or activity receiving federal funds. ,,186 Conversely,
"Title VI does not apply to programs conducted directly by fed. ,,187
eral agenCIes.
The threshold question in a Title VI case then, is whether
the state or local government defendant is receiving federal
funds. Typically, federal financial assistance for environmental
protection to state and local governments is extensive because
most federal environmental laws provide funding for state prol86
grams. On an annual basis, the EPA awards financial assistance in the form of grants to state and local agencies that administer continuing environmental programs under statutes
that EPA is charged to administer, including the Clean Air
Act,189 the Clean Water Act,190 and the solid Waste Disposal
Act. 191 Thus, it should not be too difficult for the environmental
justice advocate to establish a federal financial nexus under
Title VI.
B. GUARDIANS REQUIRES PROOF OF PuRPOSEFUL
DISCRIMINATION

In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission of New
York,t92 the Supreme Court decided whether Title VI reaches

186 EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigation of Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits 3 (Feb.1998) <http://www.e8.epa.gov/oeca/oejltitlevi.html>.
lS6

Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1250 (M.D.Ala. 1998).

187 Williams, 931 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Fagan v. United States Small Bus. Admin.,
783 F.Supp. 1455, 1456 n.10 (D.D.C. 1992), affd., 19 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

186 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
189 42 U.S.C. § 7401(West 1999).

190

191

33 U.S.C. § 1251 (West 1999).
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (West 1999).

192 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination.
Guardians involved a class of minority police officers who
claimed that the City of New York violated Title VI by appointing and terminating officers based on an examination
that had a discriminatory impact on African-American and
Hispanic candidates. 11M Although seven members of the court
agreed that proving a violation required discriminatory intent,
the rationale behind that rule did not command a majority.196 .
Justice Powell even remarked in his concurring opinion that
the lack of a majority opinion would "further confuse rather
than guide" the law interpreting Title VI. l96 Two years later, in
Alexander v. Choate,197 a unanimous Court clarified the holding
of Guardians and established a two-part test to determine
whether a violation had occurred. 198 In the first prong, the
Court held that Title VI directly reached only intentional discrimination. l99 In the second, the Court held that disparate impact claims were governed by agency regulations implementing
Title VI.2OO
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,201 cited in Guardians,
eight justices agreed that Title VI applied to private actions
against a state or local agencies that received federal funds.202
Furthermore, they recognized that the question of whether a
plaintiff has a cause of action "is analytically distinct and prior
to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled
to receive.,,203 Thus, when answering the first prong in Alexan-

193 See id. at 584.
11M See id. at 585.
196 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).
196

.

•

Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608 (Powell, J., concurnng).

197 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
198 See id. at 293.
199 See
200

id.

See id.

201 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
202
203

Guardians, 463 U.S. at 594-595.

Id. at 595.
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der, "[t]he usual rule is that where legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is available, a federal court may
use any available remedy to afford full relief.,,204 Consequently,
in Guardians, Justice White, announcing the judgment of the
Court, concluded, "compensatory relief, or other relief based on
past violations of the conditions attached to the use of federal
funds, is not available as a private remedy for Title VI violations not involving intentional discrimination.,,206 In other
words, damages are available in a private cause of action only
for intentional violations of Title VI. Supporting this interpretation, the Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,206 observed that the clear majority of the Guardians
Court "expressed the view that damages were available under
Title VI in an action seeking remedies for an intentional violation, and no Justice challenged the traditional presumption in
favor of a federal court's power to award appropriate relief in a
cognizable cause of action.,,207
C. TITLE VI REGULATIONS ONLY REQUIRES PROOF OF
DISPARATE IMPACT

Soon after Title VI was enacted, a Presidential task force,
including the Justice Department, produced model Title VI
enforcement regulations mandating that "recipients of federal
funds not use criteria or methods of administration which have
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination.,,208 Thereafter, seven federal agencies and departments carrying out this
mandate quickly promulgated regulations that applied a disparate impact or effects test.209 Thus, while a cause of action

204

[d.

206

[d. at 602-603 (emphasis added).

206

503 U.S. 60 (1992).

207 [d. at 70. See also Lane v. Pens, 518 U.S. 187, 191(1996) (citing Franklin for the
interpretation that a "clear majority" of the Court in Guardians confirmed that damages were available for intentional violations of Title VI).
208

Guardians, 463 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citing 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(bX2) (1964».

209 See ill.
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brought under the statute requires proof of discriminatory intent, an administrative claim filed with a federal agency under
the regulations requires only proof of disparate impact.
After the initial promulgation of regulations, all Cabinet
Departments and about forty federal agencies adopted standards barring programs with a discriminatory impact. 21o In
1984, pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI, EPA's Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR"), which handles Title VI complaints, similarly
issued regulations prohibiting recipients from using:
criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex,
or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with
respect to individuals of a particular race, color, na.. or sex.
. 211
· al ongm
t Ion
Unfortunately, environmental justice groups have had little
success filing Title VI complaints with the EPA. As a result,
environmental justice groups from around the country met
from May 31 to June 1, 1998 in Oakland, California for the
annual conference of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ("NEJAC") to demand that the Environmental
Protection Agency prosecute polluters of low-income and minority communities under its regulations. 212 In response to this

210 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Regulations of the
Cabinet Departments are as follows. Dept. of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(bX2) (1982);
Dept. of Commerce, 15 CF.R. § 8.4(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Defense, 32 C.F.R. §
300.4(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Education, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Energy,
10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.13(c), (d) (1982); Dept. of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. §§
80.3(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.42(2Xi),
(3) (1982); Dept. of Interior, 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.3(b)(2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Justice, 28
C.F.R. §§ 42.104(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Labor, 29 C.F.R. §§ 31.3(bX2), (3) (1982);
Dept. of State, 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(bX2) (1982); Dept. of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. §§
21.5(bX2), (3) (1982); Dept. of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(4) (1982). For a listing of
the federal agencies with such standards, see CFR Index (1982)." [d. at n.7.
211
212

40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1999) (emphasis added).

See Angela Rowen, EPA MIA, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN (June 10, 1998) at
1 available at <http://www.sibg.com/Newsl3213610nGuardlindeLhtml >.
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demand, Ann Wood, head of the OCR, told environmentalists
that the agency does not have the resources to process all the
218
complaints it receives. Indeed, EPA has received fifty Title
VI complaints since 1993 and of those, twenty-eight have been
rejected, fifteen are under investigation, and seven are pending
approval or rejection; not one, however, has been upheld. 214
In February of 1998, the OCR released its Interim Guidance
for Investigation of Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits, which is intended to provide a framework for
processing the increasing number of Title VI complaints alleging discriminatory effects from the issuance of pollution control permits by state and local agencies that receive EPA
funding. 216 As explained in the Guidance, one of the conditions
for receiving funding under EPA's continuing environmental
program grants is that the recipient agencies comply with
EPA's Title VI regulations for as long as any EPA funding is
extended. 216 In the event that EPA finds discrimination in a
recipient's permitting program and the recipient is not able to
come into compliance voluntarily, EPA is required by its Title
VI regulations to initiate procedures to deny, annul, suspend,
or terminate EPA funding. 217 EPA may also use any other
means authorized by law, including a referral of the matter to
the Department of Justice, to obtain compliance. 218
In Select Steel Corp. of America, the first case to be adjudicated under Title VI regulations and EPA's Interim Guidance,
EPA dismissed the complaint after an investigation and adjudication that lasted an incredibly short period of only two
219
months. Within this time frame, as outlined in EPA's In-

id
S ee .
214 S
ee id. at 2.
218

216
216
217
218

See EPA, Interim Guidance supra note 185.
.••

See 40 C.F.R. § 7.80(a)(2)(w) (1999).
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.115(e), 7. 130(b) (1999).
See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a) (1999).

219 See EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint) available at
<http://www.epa.gov/reg500pa/8teelcvr.htm> (Complaint filed June 9, 1998; Accepted
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terim Guidance, EPA was to follow five basic steps in analyzing the allegations of discriminatory effects from a permit decision. In the first step of this process, EPA was "to identify the
population affected by the permit that triggered the complaint.,,220 In Select Steel, however, EPA found no adverse effect
from the permitted activity, and therefore, found no discriminatory effect that would violate Title VI and EPA's implementing regulations. 221 EPA had thus conducted merely a cursory one-step evaluation and dismissed the complaint without
considering steps two through five.
It is interesting to note that EPA's Interim Guidance states
that an individual may file a private right of action in court to
enforce the nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or
EPA's implementing regulations without first exhausting administrative remedies. 222 This statement is supported by a
footnote to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif.22B The
Supreme Court, however, has subsequently vacated Chester
Residents. 224 Thus, whether a private right of action exists to
enforce the regulations is unclear.

The existence of. this right is also unclear because on October 21, 1998, funds for the Interim Guidance were suspended
225
until the Guidance became finalized. As of March 3, 2000,

for Investigation on August 17, 1998; Dismissed on October 30, 1998). "After reviewing
all of the materials submitted and information gathered during the investigation, EPA
has not found a violation of Title VI and EPA's implementing regulations. Accordingly,
EPA is dismissing the complaint as of the date of this letter." Id. at 5.
220

EPA, Interim Guidance supra note 185 at 8. "The affected population is that
which suffers the adverse impacts of the permitted activity." Id.
~1.

.

See EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complamt).

222

22B
224

•

See id. at 3.
•

See id. at 10.
See 524 U.S. 974 (1998).

225

.

See H.R. 4194, Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (Enrolled Bill, Sent to
President) signed on October 21, 1998. "[N]one of the funds made available in this Act
may be used to implement or administer the interim guidance issued on February 5,
1998." Id.
.
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OCR was still in the process of revising the Interim Guidance,
with no date proposed for publishing the Final Guidance. 226
Whenever this Guidance is finally published, however, it may
or may not allow for a private right of action, as it does now,
without first exhausting the Title VI administrative complaint
procedures as is currently required by well-settled case law.
Moreover, it may be difficult to circumvent the Supreme
Court's reasoning that "[w]here the rights of individuals are
affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures.,,227 Nevertheless, while funding is still unavailable
any administrative complaints filed after October 21, 1998 will
.
228
be processed under the regulations.
D. CHESTER RESIDENTS PROVIDES FOR A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER TITLE VI REGULATIONS
In Chester Residents for Quality Living v. Seif,229 city residents and a nonprofit public interest corporation brought an
action against the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection Agency based on Title VI and EPA's regulations regarding the issuance of permits for the construction of waste
facilities.23O The defendants moved to dismiss for both failure to
state a claim under Title VI, as the plaintiffs did not allege discriminatory intent, and for failure to state a claim under EPA
regulations, as there is no private right of action under them.231
The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss
Claim I, which alleged that the defendants violated Title VI,
because they did not allege discriminatory intent; the court,
however, granted plaintiffs' leave to amend their complaint. 232
The court also dismissed Claims II and III, which alleged that
226

Telephone Interview with Michael Mattheisen, Program Analyst, US EPA, Office of Civil Rights (March 3, 2000).

227 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,235 (1974).
228
229

See id. See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.120-7.130 (1999).

230

See id. at 414-15.

944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

231
See id. at 415.
232
See id. at 417
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the defendants violated EPA's regulations, finding no private
cause of action existed under the EPA civil rights regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI.233 Subsequently, the plaintiffs decided not to amend their complaint
and the district court therefore entered a final judgment on
that count.234 This may have been an error for the plaintiffs
given the apparent disparate impact and supporting historical
evidence of discrimination.235
The plaintiffs, nevertheless, appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit the issue of whether a
private right of action exists under the regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI.236 In analyzing this
issue, the Third Circuit stated that because Guardians did not
decide whether a private right of action existed under the section and because it was a case of first impression for the circuit, it would apply its own three-prong test to determine
whether such a right existed in this case.237 After doing so, the
Third Circuit concluded "that private plaintiffs may maintain
an action under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated
by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.,,236
Following the Third Circuit's decision on December 30,
1997, the defendants then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.239 Two months later, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

233 See ill.
.
234 Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir. 1997).
235 See Chester Residents, 944 F. Supp. 413. Plaintiffs point to defendants grant of
five waste facility permits for facilities located within Chester since 1987. Only two
Census Tracts in all of Delaware County contained more than one waste facility and
both of these were located in areas with populations that were predominately AfricanAmerican. See ill. at 415-16.
236
See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927.
237
See ill. at 929, 933.

238

239

ld. at 937.

See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d 925, petition for cert. filed (March 30, 1998) (No.
97-1620).
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240

was granted.
On August 17, 1998, however, the Supreme
Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision as moot because four
months earlier, in April 1998, the petitioners had revoked the
waste facilities permit after it had failed to apply for an extension.241 The Court thus remanded the case back to the Third
Circuit with instructions to dismiss, citing United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc.242 Under Munsingwear, the "established
practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in
the federal system which has become moot while on its way
here or pending [a] decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.,,243 This procedure not only allows for "future relitigation
of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment,
review of which was prevented through happenstance," but
also preserves the rights of all the parties and prejudices no
244
one.
Because the Supreme Court's decision clears the path for
future litigation, if the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Agency reissues the permit for the construction of the waste facility, another plaintiff would have to retry
the issue of whether a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. As of now, because of the vacated decision,
the Supreme Court has never decided the issue. Several other
circuit courts nevertheless seem to believe that an implied
cause of action in federal district court exists under Title VI
regulations.

240 See Seifv. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 915 (1998),
cerl granted (U.S. June 8, 1998) (No. 97-1620).

241 See Seif, 524 U.S. 974.
242 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
243
244

Id. at 39-40.
•

See id.
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E. SEVERAL CIRCUIT COURTS PROVIDE FOR A PRIvATE CAUSE
OF ACTION UNDER TITLE VI REGULATIONS

While the Third Circuit in Chester Residents correctly observed that the Supreme Court in Guardians did not "explicitly
address whether a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations promulgated under section
602,,,246 other Circuit Courts have expressly found that a private cause of action can be maintained in federal district court
under the regulations. In David K. v. Lane,246 for example, the
Seventh Circuit observed that "[i]t is clear that plaintiffs may
maintain a private cause of action to enforce the regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.,,247 The
court also observed, however, that "plaintiffs need not show
intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail on a claim
brought under these administrative regulations. Evidence of a
discriminatory effect is sufficient.,,248
In another Seventh Circuit case, Gomez v. Illinois State
Board Of Education,249 the court recognized that "[a]lthough
the voting of the Justices may be difficult for the reader to discern at first, a majority of the Court in Guardians Association
concluded that a discriminatory-impact claim could be maintained under those regulations, although not under the statute.,,250 The Seventh Circuit, however, clearly misconstrued
Guardians for the proposition that "the plaintiffs Title VI
claim based on the implementing regulations survives the defendant's 12(b)(6) challenge.,,261

245

246

•

Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 929.
839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988).

247

ld. at 1274 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Guardians, 463 U.S. 582.
246 lei.
249

250

251

811 F.2d 1030, 1044-1045 (7th Cir. 1987).
.

ld. at 1044-1045 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607, D. 27, 608, D. 1).
ld. at 1045.
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In another case, Larry P. v. Riles,252 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that "proof of discriminatory effect suffices to
establish liability when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to the statute rather than the statute
itself.,,253 While the Ninth Circuit accurately quotes Justice
Powell's footnote in Guardians, the very next sentence states
that "the regulations may be enforced only in a suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983; anyone invoking the implied right of action
under Title VI would be limited by the discriminatory-intent
standard to prove violations of Title VI.,,254 The latter statement is incorrect because the Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
Choate, which was decided later, held that "actions [by state
agencies receiving federal funds] having a disparate impact on
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI.,,255 Consequently,
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VI disparate-impact claims is clearly erroneous.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Elston v. Talladega County Board
of Education,256 stated that "the regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a disparate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those
actions are not intentionally discriminatory.,,257 Thus, without
ever deciding the issue, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that
there was a private right of action in federal district court to
redress violations of Title VI regulations.
Similarly, in Villanueva v. Carere,258 the Tenth Circuit assumed, without ever deciding that it had subject-matter juris-

252

793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).

253 [d. at 981·82 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608 D. 1 (Powell, J., CODCurring)
(emphasis added).
2M

255
256

257

258

•

•

GuardlGns, 463 U.S. at 608 D.1 (emphasls added).
Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added).
997 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1993).

[d. at 1406 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S at 584, D. 2).
85 F.3d 481 (lOth Cir. 1996).
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diction over Title VI regulations, that a private right of action
was available under the regulations. 259 The Court observed
that "[a]lthough Title VI itself proscribes only intentional discrimination, certain regulations promulgated pursuant to Title
VI prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on groups protected by the act, even in the absence of discriminatory
intent.,,260 The Tenth Circuit then went on, without jurisdiction, to uphold the "district court's findings that neither the
school closings nor the opening of PSAS resulted in a negative
disparate impact on the Hispanic population. ,,261 Thus, the
court found for the appellees with respect to the parents' Title
VI claims. 262 Significantly, the district court, as well as the
Tenth Circuit, assumed jurisdiction for an implied right of action under the regulations. Thus, it would appear that the
courts are confusing the term "claim under the regulations" for
a "claim under a lawsuit" filed in federal district court.
While a number of circuit court of appeal decisions seem to
allow a private cause of action under the regulations in federal
district COurt,263 the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate2&f.
seems to suggest that there is no private right of action in federal district court under Title VI regulations when it held that
"actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities
could be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purpose of Title VI.,,266 This, more significantly, is
supported by EPA Title VI regulations, which expressly provide private parties with an administrative mechanism
through which they can raise allegations of unintentional dis-

259

See id.

260 1d.

at 486 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584, n. 2).

261 1d. at 487.
262 See id.
263

See Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 936-37 (collecting cases).

264

469 U.S. 287 (1985).

266 1d. at 293 (emphasis added). See also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610, n.3 (Powell,
J., concurring). "Congress's creation of an express administrative procedure for remedying violations strongly suggests that it did not intend that Title VI rights be enforced
privately either under the statute itself or under § 1983." 1d. (emphasis added).
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crimination.266 Because it is axiomatic that plaintiffs must first
exhaust administrative remedies, the environmental justice
advocate must first look to the agency regulations for procedures to resolve state actions that have an unjustifiable disparate impact on communities of color.
F.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Regardless of whether the Title VI regulations allow for a
private right of action, administrative actions thereunder may
be challenged in Federal District Court under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA,,).267 Under this Act, a plaintiff need
not establish a private right action under a statute.268 Rather,
because EPA's Title VI regulations provide for a federal administrative complaint process,269 any agency action can be
challenged under the APA. 270 Where Title VI agency regulations do not provide for an administrative complaint procedure,
however, the advocate could presumably go directly to district
271
court.
Judicial review under the APA requires both federal agency
action and finality. Regarding the first requirement of a federal agency action, Section 702 provides in part, "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, . . . is entitled
to judicial review thereof. tt272 Moreover, an action in Federal
District Court, which seeks a relief other than money damages

266 See 40 C.F.R. §§7.120-7.130 (1999). "A person who believes that he or she or a
specific class of persons has been discriminated against in violation of this part may
tile a complaint." [d. at § 7.120(a).

267 See 5 U.S.C.A §§ 701(a), 702 (West 1999).

266 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979). See also California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
269

40 C.F.R. § 7.120-7.130 (1999).

270 5 U.S.C. § 551 (West 1999).
271

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 (1970) ("neither the principle of 'exhaustion
of administrative remedies' nor the doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction' has any application" to a situation where the agency lacks procedures for complainants to "trigger and
participate in" the administrative process). See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707, n. 41.

272

.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (West 1999).
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and states a claim that an "agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under
color of legal authority" will not be dismissed or denied "on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the United
States is an indispensable party.,,273 In other words, Section
702 waives the sovereign immunity of the United States in
suits seeking judicial review of agency actions where judicial
review has not been expressly authorized by statute. 274 Judicial
review under the APA thus may be denied only if Congress
clearly intended to foreclose review or the issue is one committed to agency discretion. 275
The second requirement under the APA is that agency action must be final before judicial review will be permitted. Section 704 provides in part that "[a]gency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. ,,276
On the other hand, "a preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to
review on the review of the final agency action. ,,277 The courts
have imposed this finality element as a pragmatic consideration to precede judicial review of administrative actions. 278
When determining whether an agency action is final, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California,279 held
that three factors must be considered: (1) whether the agency
action represented a definitive statement of the agency's position; (2) whether the action had a direct and immediate effect
of the day-to-day business of the complaining parties; and (3)
whether judicial review would interfere with the proper func-

273

Id. (emphasis added).

274 See Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1988).
275 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (West 1999).
276 5 U.S.C. § 704 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
277 Id.
278 See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105·107 (1977); Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
279 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
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280

tioning of the agency and the courts. Because an EPA rejection or ultimate dismissal of a Title VI Administrative Complaint satisfies these three elements, a plaintiff could seek re281
view in Federal District Court under the APA. Even if an
agency action does not meet these requirements, it may still be
subject to judicial review when the harm to the person seeking
review outweighs the harm to the administrative process from
permitting such review.282 Under this exception, when an
agency action, or inaction, will endanger public health or
283
safety, judicial review is immediately available.
In addition to these two requirements, judicial review, as a
general matter, is not available until the plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies. 284 The purpose of this is
to protect agency autonomy, and to promote judicial
efficiency.285 The principle of autonomy recognizes that agencies, not courts, should have responsibility for the programs
286
that Congress has charged them to administer. The principle
of judicial efficiency recognizes that if the complaint is resolved
at the agency level, judicial review may never be required, or if
the complaint is not resolved, at least a useful record may be
287
produced. There are, however, exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement. The most significant is that administrative
remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interest in immediate judicial review outweighs the government's interests
in efficiency or administrative autonomy.288 Application of this

280 See

id. at 239-240.

See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (West 1999). Cf. Clark v. Busey, 959 F.2d 808, 813 (9th Cir.
1992) (agency inaction on petition for rule making is not ripe for review where inaction
does not amount to denial).
281

282

See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098-1099 (D.C. Cir.

1970).
283 See
284

285
286

id.

See Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992).
•

See id.

287
See id.
288 See id.
. at 146.
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balancing principle is "intensely practical ... because attention
is directed to both the nature of the claim presented and the
characteristics of the particular administrative procedure provided.,,289 One significant factor of this balancing, which a court
will look at in determining whether to allow immediate review
of agency action, is the irreparable injury to the plaintiff.290
Once· a plaintiff has satisfied these requirements, a court
will then review the action under the APNs standard of review. Unlike other statutes, the APNs standard narrow and
presumes that the agency action is valid.291 The agency action,
however, is not shielded from a "thorough, probing, in-depth
review.tt292 Additionally, while the APA does not give a court
power "to substitute its judgment for that of the agency," it
does allow the court to "consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.tt293 Consequently, under the Administrate Procedure Act, a court must set aside an
agency's action only if the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.tt294
Normally, an agency action is considered arbitrary and capricious when the agency bases its decision on factors that Congress did not want considered, completely fails to consider an
important aspect of the issue, makes a decision that is contrary to law and the evidence before it, or offers an explanation
for its decision that is so implausible that it cannot be attributed to a difference of opinion or agency expertise.295 Moreover,
under environmental statutes, an action may be arbitrary and

289

d
L .

290 See ill.
. at 147.
291 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976).
292

293
294

. 295

••

CItizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).

[d. at 416.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (West 1999).
See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).
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capricious if the agency has not "considered the environmental
consequences" of its action.296
In addition to reviewing an agency's action for a clear error
of judgment, a court also has the ability to review the agency's
adherence to applicable regulations and agency programs. 297
Thus, an individual who is adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action, such as ·EPA's failure to comply with Title VI
Regulations, "may ask a court to set aside the agency action
which is not in accordance with law or to compel agency action
unlawfully withheld.n298 Under section 706(1), when so requested, "[t]he reviewing court shall compel [an] agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.,,299 Consequently,
the environmental justice advocate should review the federal
regulations to insure that EPA is complying with the Title VI
regulations and that EPA is not unreasonably delaying administration of the regulations. 3°O If EPA is not complying with
the regulations in a timely manner, an action should be filed in
Federal District Court challenging the EPA's actions under the
APA.

As another general matter, judicial review is not available
unless the plaintiff has standing. To have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be within the zone of interests protected by the statute allegedly violated. 30l While environmental justice plaintiffs
may have standing to sue under the APA, the state action
complained of in the Title VI complaint may elude judicial review if the complained of project proceeds to completion. Un-

296

Strycher's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1979).

297 See Community Action of Laramie County, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347, 352
(10th Cir. 1989) (collecting case8 for principle that agency's "failure to follow ita own
regulations ... may be challenged under the APA").
298

•

NAACP v. Secretary of Housmg & Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st
Cir.1987).
299
300

•

5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (West 1999) (emphaSIS added).
See, e.g., EPA Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 7.120 (1999).

301 See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151-53 (1970).
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fortunately, because EPA cannot issue injunctions under the
regulations and because Title VI Administrative Complaints
can take as long as two years to resolve, it is imperative that
the environmental justice advocate get his foot in the federal
court door as quickly as possible to avoid irreparable injury.802
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Fair v. United States
E.P.A.,808 "[t]he sole reason this case 'evaded review' is the appellants' failure to take requisite action. They posted no bond
accompanying their request for a preliminary injunction with
the district court, nor did they seek a stay of the district court's
judgment pending this appeal.,,304
An interesting situation arises when the environmental justice advocate has both a Title VI claim for intentional discrimination as well as the lessor included claim of disparate
impact. Does the advocate file a Title VI complaint in federal
district court against the state or local agency for intentional
discrimination and concurrently file an administrative complaint with the federal agency, such as the EPA, for state
agency actions having a disparate impact? While no court has
addressed this specific issue, some guidance can be found in
the judicially created doctrine of "primary jurisdiction." If the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable, the court must
305
allow the agency to go first.

In deciding the case of United States v. Western Pacific
Railroad CO.,806 the Supreme Court was forced to consider at
the outset whether .the lower court had properly applied the
primary jurisdiction doctrine; that is, the court considered
whether the lower court had "correctly allocated the issues in
the suit between the jurisdiction of the [agency] and that of the

802 See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147 (administrative remedy deemed inadequate
"[m]ost often ... because of delay by the agency").
803

795 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1986).

304 [d. at 855.
305

See Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).

306 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
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COurt.,,307 In holding that "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies,
is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies charged with particular
regulatory duties,,,308 the Supreme Court stated that while the
exhaustion rule "applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance by an administrative agency alone,,,309 primary jurisdiction "applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body.,,310 Additionally, with regard to exhaustion, 'judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has run its course," for primary jurisdiction "the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views.,,311 This referral of issues to
the administrative agency, however, "does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction.,,312 Rather, the court still has the discretion to either "retain jurisdiction or, if the parties would not be
unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the case without
prejudice.,,313 Consequently, applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction to a Title VI claim when both intentional discrimination and disparate impact is alleged would suggest that the
administrative agency would first determine the lesserincluded claim of disparate impact. Once this issue of disparate impact is determined by the agency, the court could resume jurisdiction to determine whether the disparate impact
could be supported with the circumstantial evidence necessary
to prove intentional discrimination.

307 [d. at
308

62.

[d. at 63.

309 [d.

310 [d. at 54.
311
Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 54.
312
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258,268-269 (1993).
313 [d.
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In cases where primary jurisdiction is found, the court
must decide what to do with a case that it has remanded to the
agency. The Supreme Court in Best v. Humboldt Mining CO. 314
considered just that issue. In Best, the United States sued in
district court to condemn certain real property, the mining
316
claims on which were arguably invalid. With regard to these
claims, the Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Land Management had primary jurisdiction.316 The Court, however, also
held that the district court should retain the condemnation
case on its docket for a trial on the remaining issues after the
Bureau resolved the claim dispute. 317
In cases where primary jurisdiction is found inapplicable,
however, the court may proceed with its action regardless of
the happenings in the agency proceeding. In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 3~8 for example, a plaintiff who was "bumped"
from an airline flight because of overbooking sued the airline
in a common law fraud action. 319 Although the Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") had the power to order airlines to cease unfair and deceptive practices, the Supreme Court permitted the
action to continue in federal district court because a CAB proceeding would not have been as effective. 320 The CAB had no
power to award damages to the plaintiff nor could it immunize
321
the airline from damages in any future suitS. Similarly, in
Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Merchants' Elevator CO.,322 the
Supreme Court held that a court might also maintain jurisdic-

314
316
316

371 U.S. 334 (1963).

See id. at 334-335.
See id. at 339.

317

See id. at 340.
318 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
319
320
321
322

See id. at 293.
See id. at 305-306.
See id. at 302.
259 U.S. 285 (1922).
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tion over the matter where it needs no special expertise to re323
view the administrative action.
Since the law is not yet settled in the area of concurrent Title VI claims, it is suggested that the advocate file claims in
both federal district court and the federal agency under the
3u
regulations to avoid any statute of limitations issues.
G. SUMMARY

A private cause of action can be maintained under Title VI
against state and local agencies, which receive federal funds,
for damages as well as for declaratory and injunctive relief under the discriminatory intent standard. Conversely, under Title VI regulations the only relief available is limited to an equitable remedy since damages are only available for intentional
violations of Title VI. Despite this, an environmental justice
advocate should first look to the regulations for any administrative process through which to resolve administrative complaints as an advocate may be required to exhaust all Title VI
administrative remedies prior to filing a cause of action in federal court under the APA. 326 The Title VI regulations adopted
by EPA may provide a clue for how EPA will investigate and
326
resolve such an administrative complaint. An advocate, however, may not be required to exhaust all remedies when the
agency action, or inaction, will endanger public health or
safety or result in irreparable injury to plaintiffs. In such case,
judicial review is immediately available. During this process, a
suit for damages for intentional violations of Title VI can be
tried before a jury; equitable relief under the APA, however, is
going to be decided by a judge. The advocate's best chance for
success is to get the case before a jury, especially one composed

323
324

See [d. at 294.
See infra notes 465-468 and accompanying text for a discussion of timely filing.

See Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577,
1581 n. 25 (1992) (listing all federal cabinet Departments with Title VI regulations
codifying the discriminatory effect standard).
326 See 40 CFR § 7.120 (1999).
325
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of the representative minority population affected by the government's decision.

IV. CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS UNDER FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

A

INGENERAL

Title VI was "meant to cover only those situations where
federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn,
provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary."s27
Title VI, therefore, is inapplicable to programs conducted directly by federal agencies,328 such as the Clean Water Act,329
the Safe Drinking Water Act,330 the Clean Air Act,331 the Solid
Waste Disposal Act,332 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act,333 and the Toxic Substance Control
334
Act. Environmental justice advocates thus have relied on the
citizen suit provisions contained in these, and most other federal environmental statutes, to enforce federal programs. Generally, the citizen suit provisions in virtually all the major federal environmental statutes provide that "any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf.,,335 Furthermore, the

327 Williams v. Glickman, 931 F. Supp. I, 6 (D.D.C. 1996). See also 42 U.S.C. §
2000d4a (West 1999).
328 See id. at 5.6.
329

See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387 (West 1999).

330 See

42 U.S.C. §§ 300£ - 300j-26 (West 1999).

331 See id. §§ 7401 - 7671q.
332 See id. §§ 6901 - 6992k.
333 See id. §§ 11001 to 11050.
334

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 2692 (West 1999).

335 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j-8(a) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (West 1999). The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 (West 1999), however, does not contain a
citizen suit provision.
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civil action can be commenced against any person, including
the United States, and any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amend336
ment to the U.S. Constitution.
A citizen can also sue the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure to perform any
act or duty under the statute that is not discretionary.337
As a jurisdictional requirement, most, if not all, federal environmental statutes require plaintiffs to give a notice of intent
33S
to sue. Furthermore, they generally provide that no action
may be commenced prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the alleged violation (1) to the Administrator,
(2) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (3) to
any alleged violator of the statute. 339 This provision is mandatory and failure to give notice, in the manner prescribed by the
341
Administrator in the regulations,340 will lead to a dismissal.
The purpose of the sixty-day notice is to give the violator the
opportunity to correct the violation, as well as to give the Administrator the opportunity to enforce the statute using their
resources. 342 If the Administrator or other federal or state
authorities are "diligently prosecuting" the action, no citizen
suit may be commenced, though citizens are authorized to intervene in federal enforcement actions as a matter of right. 343
Consequently, the environmental justice advocate will need to

336 See

id.

337 See id. (emphasis added).
336

•

See, e.g., TOXIC Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j-8(b) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1l046(d) (West 1999).
339
S ee id.

340 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(2) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j-8(b)(3) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(2) (West 1999); Emergency Planning andCommunity Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1l046(d)(2) (West 1999).
341

See Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989).

342

See id. at 29.

343

See id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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refer to the appropriate regulations to satisfy the notice requirements.
Typically, most environmental statutes provide that whenever on the basis of any information the Administrator determines that any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement of the statute, the Administrator may either issue
an order that assesses a civil penalty for any past or current
violation and! or requires compliance immediately, or within a
specified time period. 344 Alternatively, the Administrator may
commence a civil action in a United States district court in the
district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief,
345
including a temporary or permanent injunction. The Administrator .can also seek criminal penalties against any person
346
who knowingly or willfully violates the statute. Given the
plethora of options, the government enforcement authorities
enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to initiate enforcement proceedings and in choosing the type of en347
forcement action to initiate. Because judicial enforcement
actions generally are more formal and more expensive, environmental authorities usually go to court only to prosecute the
most egregious violations. For example, in fiscal year 1997,
EPA referred a total of 426 civil cases and 278 criminal cases
348
to the Department of Justice for prosecution. If no enforcement action is taken, however, within the sixty-day time period, the environmental justice advocate can then file suit in
federal district court.

344 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (West 1999); Clean Wa·
ter Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2
(West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (West 1999); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7613 (West 1999); Emergency pianning and Community Right-To-Know Act,
42 U.S.C. §11045 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
346 See id.

346
347

See id.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985).

348 EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Fiscal Year 1997 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report (visited March 28,
2000) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/97accomp.pdf> (Table A-5. EPA Civil Referrals to the
Department of Justice FY74 through FY97; Table A-4. EPA Criminal Enforcement
FY83 through FY97).
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B. GWALTNEY REQUIRES ONGOING VIOLATION
In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,349
environmental groups filed a claim in federal district court under the Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions alleging that
the permittee had violated and would continue to violate conditions on the permit by exceeding effluent limitations on certain
pollutants. 35o The district court denied the permittee's motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.351 The permittee then petitioned for certiorari. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Clean Water Act confers federal juris352
diction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.
Underlying the Court's analysis is the principle that the
objective of the Clean Water Act is "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters.,,353 The Act thus makes it unlawful to discharge any
pollutant into navigable waters except as authorized by statute. 354 Pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"),355 the Administrator may issue permits authorizing the discharge of pollutants in accordance with
specified conditions. 356 The holder of a federal NPDES permit is
then subject to enforcement action by the Administrator. 357 Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney violated the conditions of its
NPDES permits on numerous occasions by exceeding the efflu358
ent limitations on five of the seven pollutants covered. During this same period, however, Gwaltney installed new equip349

484 u.s. 49 (1987).

350

See id. at 54.

351
352

See id. at 56.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 1999).

353 [d.
354

355

§ 1251(a).

See id. § 1311(a).
See id. § 1342.

356 See
357

id. § 1342(a).

See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (West 1999).

358

See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 53.
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ment that allowed the company to be in compliance with its
359
NPDES permit for the first part of 1984. Nevertheless, in
response to the violations, environmental groups filed suit after giving notice in June 1984 to the Administrator and the
360
Virginia State Water Control Board.
These groups alleged
that the petitioner "has violated . . . [and] will continue to violate its NPDES permit.,,361
After a lengthy statutory interpretation of the citizen suit
provision phrase "to be in violation," the Supreme Court concluded, "citizens, unlike the Administrator, may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an
ongoing violation. ,,362 In other words, the citizen suit provisions
are "primarily forward looking,,,363 and "doD not permit citizen
suits for wholly past violations.,,364 In line with this reasoning,
the Court observed "the purpose of[the sixty-day] notice to the
alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into
complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render
unnecessary a citizen suit.,,365
Consequently, under the citizen suit provisions, a defendant
can simply wait to the last minute to come into compliance
with the permit. Since there is no ongoing violation, the case is
dismissed as moot. As the Gwaltney Court recognized,
"[l]ongstanding principles of mootness . . . prevent the maintenance of suit when 'there is no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated.',,366 Proving this expectation, however,
is a "heavy one" because the defendant must demonstrate that
it is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior

359
360

361

.

See ill. at 54.
See id.
[d.

362 Id.
363

at 59 (emphasis added).

Gwaltrwy, 484 U.S. at 59.

364

365

[d. at 64.
[d. at 60.

366 [d.

at 66.
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could not reasonably be expected to recur." 367 "Mere voluntary
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it
did, the courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he defendant ...
free to return to his old ways.,,368 Moreover, in determining
whether the defendant has met the burden, "[i]t is the duty of
the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by
protestations of repentance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is probability of resumption. "aS9 The mootness doctrine should thus protect plaintiffs from defendants trying to circumvent statutory
liability.
C. BEYOND GWALTNEY

On remand, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that citizen suits
could be based on "a good faith allegation of ongoing violation,"
requiring proof of such violation at trial. 370 This could be accomplished either "(1) by proving violations that continue on or
after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic
violations."a71 With these instructions, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which found that although the violations had not continued, at the time the suit
was filed "there existed a very real danger and likelihood of
further violation. "a72 The district court then reinstated the entire judgment against Gwaltney.373 Gwaltney again appealed to

367 [d. (emphasis in original).
368 United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 203
(1968) (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66).

369 United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (citing
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66).

370 Chesapeake Bay Foundation
. v. Gwaltney of Srmthfield,
.
Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171

(4th Cir. 1988).

371 See [d. at 171-72.

372 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F.Supp. 1078,
1079 (E.D. Va. 1988).
373 See id. at 1080.
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the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the trial courts
374
conclusions.
In doing so, the court held that regardless of
subsequent events, because there was an ongoing violation
when the suit was filed and because "a suit seeking penalties is
intrinsically incapable of being rendered moot by the polluter's
corrective actions" the case was not moot. 375

D.SUMMARY
The citizen suit prOVISIons of the federal environmental
statutes provide the environmental justice advocate with an
enforcement tool for ongoing violations of federal law. If a citizen suit is headed for mootness, the environmental justice advocate would be wise to invite the Administrator of the EPA to
join in the lawsuit, as this would assure standing as well as
provide penalties going to the United States Treasury for the
past violations. Even if not invited, under most citizen suit
provisions, the Administrator may intervene as a matter of
. ht .376
ng
If a defendant clearly abates the violation prior to trial, the
environmental justice advocate will have succeeded in eliminating an environmental harm, even if the abatement could

have occurred sooner. In this situation, the environmental justice advocate should be able to recover litigation costs, includ377
ing reasonable attorney and expert witness fees. The legislative history of the costs of litigation section in virtually all citi-

374

Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690 (4th
Cir.1989).
375

Id. at 696.

376

See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(1) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
30Oj-8(c) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and C!lmmunity Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(h)(l) (West 1999).
377

See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
30Oj-8(d) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0 (West 1999).
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zen suit statutes recognizes that the award of costs "should
extend to plaintiffs in actions, which result in successful
abatement but do not reach a verdict. ,,378

V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN FILING CLAIMS UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE, TITLE VI, AND FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES

Whether an environmental justice advocate files a civil action under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, the challenge will be the same: proving discriminatory intent. However, while the Equal Protection Clause will be available for
cases where the government actor is not receiving federal
funds, Title VI will only be available when federal funds are
being received. A citizen suit filed under the federal environmental statutes creates its own unique challenges. Regardless,
bringing the case before a jury will provide the environmental
justice advocate with the best chance of success.
A. JURISDICTION

1. Under the Equal Protection Clause

Under a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge,S79 subject matter jurisdiction will be found at 28 U.S.C. §
1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section
1983 creates a mechanism for recovering both monetary damages and injunctive relief from governmental actors and entities whose actions under "color of' state or local law deprive a
plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
United States Constitution or federal statutes. 380 Thus, "[t]he

378 Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 n.6. But see

Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992)
(explaining that "to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at
least some relief on the merits of his claim").

379 An equal protection challenge can also be maintained against a federal agency

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

380
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purpose of section 1983 is to deter state actors from using the
badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.,,381 Section 1983, however, " 'is not itself a
source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ,,382 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that "[a] broad construction
of section 1983 is compelled by the statutory language, which
speaks of deprivations of 'any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws.' Accordingly, 'we have
repeatedly held that the coverage of [section 1983] must be
broadly construed.,,,s83

2. Under Federal Statutes
In Maine v. Thiboutot,384 the Court ruled that parties may
rely upon section 1983 to challenge violations of federal stat385
utes as well as constitutionallaw. "[U]nder section 1983 state
'officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights law, but
for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory
rights as well.' ,,386 However, not all violations of a federal statute give rise to section 1983 actions. 387 "A plaintiff alleging a
violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue under
section 1983 unless 'the statute [does] not create enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of [sec-

8ubject8, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
381

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).

382 Albright v.

383
384

385

Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991).
448 U.S. 1 (1980).

See id. at 4 (emphasis added).

3S6 [d.

387

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

(emphasis added).
.

Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-356 (1992).
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tion] 1983,' or unless 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.' ,,388
With regard to this second section 1983 limitation, "[t]he
burden is on the State to show 'by express provision or other
specific evidence from the statute itself that congress intended
to foreclose such private enforcement. m389 The Court in Middlesex City Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers,390
found such foreclosure because of the comprehensiveness of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act's enforcement scheme,
which granted EPA substantial power to use of noncompliance
orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties to enforce its provi391
sions. The Court in Sea Clammers also held that even though
most federal environmental citizen suit provisions contain
savings clauses,392 which generally provide that nothing in the
citizen suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person
... may have under any statute or common law or to seek ...
any other relief," the express remedies provided in the federal
environmental statutes "preclude suits for damages under [section] 1983, and that the saving clauses do not require a con. ,,393
trary concl US1,On.
The reach of the Sea Clammers decision, however, is narrow. One reason is that the cases in which congressional intent
is found to foreclose a section 1983 remedy are "exceptional."
Accordingly, section 1983 "remains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed violations of federal law .,,3IM
Another reason is because the decision does not "stand for the

388
389
390

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 496 U.S. 49B, 50B (1990).

ld. at 520-521.
453 U.S. 1 (19B1).

391.
..
See id. at 13 (Clting 33 U.S.C. § 1251).
392 See, e.g., ToXIC. Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (West 1999); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-B
(West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (West 1999); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act,
42 U.S.C. § 11046 (West 1999).
393
31M

Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 30 n.31 (emphasis added).
••

LiVldas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107,133 (1994).
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proposition that a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently existing constitutional rights, which have contours
distinct from the statutory claim;" rather, it "speaks only to
whether federal statutory rights can be enforced both through
the statute itself and through section 1983.,,395 Consequently,
there is nothing in the holding of Sea Clammers to suggest
that an environmental justice advocate could not file a section
1983 civil action under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI
for intentional discrimination. There is also nothing in Sea
Clammers to suggest that the advocate could not file an administrative complaint under Title VI regulations for state actions that have a disparate impact on communities of color.
Instead, See Clammers only limits the availability of the damages component of a section 1983 remedy under federal environmental statute enforcement proceedings. Remedies will,
therefore, be limited to the specific relief available under the
various citizen suit provisions.

Sea Clammers' decision regarding the relief available under
the savings clause was revisited in the subsequent case of International Paper Co. v. Ouellette. 396 In this case, the Court
held that the savings clause in the Clean Water Act,397 allows
state law actions against water pollution notwithstanding the
existence of federal law and standards.896 In so holding, the
Court reasoned that the savings clause "negates the inference
that congress 'left no room' for state causes of action;,,399 rather
it "specifically preserves other state actions, and therefore
nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a
nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.,,400

895

Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (lOth Cir. 1996).

396

479 U.S. 481(1987).

397 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
398

See International Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 497.

399

Id. at 492 (emphasis added).

400

Id . at 496 (emphasis added).
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3. Under Title VI
As in a section 1983 challenge, damages, as well as injunctive relief, will be available under a Title VI intentional discrimination case. For these cases, however, the "reach of Title
VI's protection extends no further than the Fourteenth
Amendment.'",o1 Thus, jurisdiction for a Title VI challenge,
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), and 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, will be judicially implied under the holding in
Guardians only when a plaintiff has alleged an intentional discrimination.

Once this is met, under Title VI EPA regulations, an administrative complaint can be filed under Title 40, section
7.120 of the Code of Federal Regulations or under EPA's Final
Guidance, assuming they have been implemented. Judicial review of the agency determination on this administrative complaint can be immediate if the agency action, or inaction, endangers public health or safety, or after a final decision has
been rendered if brought under the APA. Relief under the
APA, however, will be limited to injunctive relief. 402

4. State Court Jurisdiction
Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Therefore, state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any
cognizable claim, including state and federal question cases,
except for certain federal question cases in which the federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction. For example, federal
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty, bankruptcy, and patent cases.403 Any doubt that a state court could
entertain such actions was dispelled by the Supreme Court in
Martinez v. California. 404 In that case, although the Court did
not answer the question of whether state courts were obligated

401
402

U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992).

See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (West 1999).

403

28 U.S.C. § 1333 (West 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (West 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(West 1999).
404 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
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to entertain section 1983 actions, it held that "Congress has
not barred them from doing SO.,,405 Consequently, in Maine v.
Thiboutot,406 the plaintiffs "exhausted their state administrative remedies and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the state superior court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under [section] 1983 for
themselves and others similarly situated.,,407 There is nothing
in the case law to suggest that an environmental justice advocate could not maintain, in a State Superior Court, an Equal
Protection Challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Title VI intentional discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, a Review of
Title VI administrative complaint under 5 U.S.C. § 702 or any
claims under the various federal environmental statute citizen
suit provisions. The advocate should thus consider whether
there would be any advantages to filing the environmental justice case in state court.
B. STANDING

In Arlington Heights, the Court considered the plaintiffs'
standing to bring the suit and found that, in a constitutional
setting, the issue is "whether the plaintiff has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [as] to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.,,408 In addition, the plaintiff must show that he is personally injured by
the challenged action of the defendant. 409 The injury, however,
may be indirect, but the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to defendant's acts or
omissions.41o Finally, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had

405
406

407

Maine, 448 U.S. at 3 n. 1 (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283-284, n. 7).
448 U.S. 1 (1980).

[d. at 3.

408 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
261 (1977).
409 See id.
410

See id.
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to show an injury that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable

.. ,,411
deClSlon.

In Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environment,412 the
Court reiterated the three constitutional requirements that
comprise the core of Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement: (1) an injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3)
redressability.413 The advocate must satisfy the standing requirements before proceeding with an environmental justice
case. Moreover, these requirements must continue to exist at
every stage of review, not merely at the time of the filing of the
414
complaint.
If the plaintiffs fail to satisfy an element of
416
standing at any point, the action becomes moot.
In Steel Co., an environmental group brought a civil action
against a steel manufacturer under the Federal Environmental
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986 ("EPCRA").416 Under this statute, civil penalties, authorized as damages, are payable to the United States Treasury.417
Consequently, the Court concluded that "the complaint fails
the third test of standing, redressability,"'IS because a damages
remedy paid to the Treasury will not redress the plaintiffs' injuries, assuming the plaintiffs' could assert an injury in fact in
the first place. Had plaintiffs alleged a "continuing or imminent violation" of EPCRA, however, "the requested injunctive
relief may well have redressed the asserted injury.,,419 In other
words, civil actions brought under federal environmental statutes, which only allow for penalties payable to the Treasury,
cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff can allege a con411
[d. at 262.
412
523 U.s. 83 (1998).
413
See id. at 103.
414
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
416
See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980).
416
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 to 11050 (West 1999).
417
See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106. See also 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c) (West 1999).
41S [d.
419
[d. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tinuing or imminent violation of the statute. Thus, Steel Co.
merely reaffirms Gwaltney's ongoing violation requirement.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. 420 also reaffirms Gwaltney's holding. In Friends of the
Earth, Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("Laidlaw")
owned and operated a hazardous waste incinerator located in
421
Roebuck, South Carolina. As part of that facility, Laidlaw
maintained a wastewater treatment plant for water used in air
pollution control devices for the incinerator.422 Laidlaw discharged that treated wastewater into the North Tyger River
pursuant to a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. 423 This permit required the defendant to monitor and report their discharges
through, for example, discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs")
and laboratory reports. 424 The plaintiffs filed suit under the
citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act on June 12,
1992, alleging discharges in excess of the permit limits.425 Although Laidlaw moved to dismiss on July 1, 1992, its motion
was denied. 425 In May 1995, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. 427 On June 27, 1995 the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and
granted, in part, Laidlaw's motion with regard to eftluent discharge violations other than mercury, citing Gwaltney v.
Chesapeake Bay Founation, Inc. 423 Thus, the only issue before
the district court was the mercury violations, as these were

420
421
422
423

956 F. Supp. 588 (D. S.C. 1997) rev'd ,120 S.Ct. 693 (2000).
See id. at 592.

See id.
See id.

424

.

•

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 890 F. Supp. 470, 475
(D.S.C. 1995).
425

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 956 F. Supp. 588, 592
(D.S.C. 1997). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (West 1999).
426
427
428

See Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 592 (motion was denied on December 14, 1992).
See id.

See id.
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ostensibly ongoing at the time the lawsuit was filed on June
12, 1992.429
In awarding civil penalties against Laidlaw, the district
court correctly reasoned that section 309(d) mandates a civil
penalty once a violation is established. 430 The court then went
on to assess a penalty of $405,800 for the 475 pre-complaint
mercury exceedance violations and 14 post-complaint violations:31 the 419 pre-complaint monitoring violations with only
one alleged post-complaint monitoring violation; and the 503
pre-complaint reporting violations with zero post-complaint
reporting violations. 432 Under Gwaltney, however, the district
court clearly erred in assessing penalties for the 475 past mercury violations and the 503 past reporting violations because in
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court had concluded, "citizens, unlike
the Administrator, may seek civil penalties only in a suit
brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation.,,433
Since the Administrator was not a party to the citizen suit, the
district court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding penalties for the past violations. Under the district court's calculations, the proper penalty assessed Laidlaw for the postcomplaint violations should have been $15,100, not $405,800.434
At this point, Laidlaw should have moved for a dismissal of
the case as being moot under Gwaltney, since Laidlaw could
have demonstrated "that it is 'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.' ,,435 The district court recognized that Laidlaw's "compli-

429 See

id.

430 See

Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 601 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); 1365(a».

431 Eleven violations occurred between June 12, 1992 and October 1992. Each year
thereafter, in 1993, 1995 and 1995, there was only one exceedance annually. See id. at
600.
432

433

See [d. at 600,609-10.
•

Gwaltney of SIIl1thfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 59 (1987) (emphasis added).
434 See Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 610 and 621. There is one monitoring violation at
$100 and fourteen exceedance violations at $15,000. [d.
435

Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (emphasis in original).
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ance history demonstrates that Laidlaw's efforts have remedied
its compliance problem.,,436 Moreover, the district court stated
that "Laidlaw has been in substantial compliance with all parameters in its NPDES permit since at least August 1992,"
including the discharge levels for all metals, temperature, pH
and all monitoring and reporting obligations. 437 "In fact, Laidlaw has been in compliance with the vast majority of its permit
requirements for a much longer period of time, extending back
to March 1991 when the [metals removal] system was installed.,,436 After Laidlaw failed to do so, however, the district
court concluded that "[t]he lack of demonstrated harm and the
fact that Laidlaw is now and has for an extended period of time
been in compliance with its permit compels the conclusion that
no injunction or other form of equitable relief is appropriate.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' request for equitable reliefis denied.,,439
Apparently not satisfied with the penalties assessed against
Laidlaw, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion by ordering an inadequate penalty.«O The Fourth
Circuit concluded, however, that because the plaintiffs did not
appeal the "denial of declaratory and injunctive relief, the only
potential relief that may be available to redress their claimed
injuries is the civil penalty imposed upon Laidlaw, which
would be paid to the United States Treasury.,,441 Accordingly,
under Steel Co., which held that civil penalties do not confer
standing to prosecute a private enforcement action under the
citizen-suit provisions because it could not redress the injury
plaintiff had allegedly suffered, the court concluded that the

486
437

Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 609 (emphasis added),

Ill. at 611.
486 Ill.

439 Id. In a separate order, the court stayed the time for a petition for attorney's
fees until the time for appeal had expired or, if either party appealed, until the appeal
was resolved. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303,
305 (4th eir. 1998).
«0 See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 305.

441

Ill. at 306.
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action was moot. 442 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, vacated the
district court's order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. 443 Consequently, not only did Laidlaw avoid $405)800 in
penalties, but "[p]laintiffs' failure to obtain relief on the merits
of their claims preclude[d] any recovery of attorney's fees or
other litigation costs because such an award is available only
to a 'prevailing or substantially prevailing party.',,444
The plaintiffs again appealed the decision and the Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that the Fourth Circuit erred when
it dismissed the suit as moot. 440 In doing so the Court stated,
"[i]n directing dismissal of the suit on grounds of mootness, the
Court of Appeals incorrectly conflated Supreme Court case law
on initial standing to bring suit, with the Court's case law on
post-commencement mootness." 440 On the initial standing issue, the court discussed the redressability requirement, the
Court observed:
[T]he civil penalties sought by [the plaintiffs] carried
with them a deterrent effect that made it likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the penalties would
redress [plaintiff's] injuries by abating current violations and preventing future ones - - as the District

442
443
444
445

See id. See also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998).
.

Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306.
[d. at 307 n.5; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999).
See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. 693, 700 (2000).

440 See id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982». In addressing the question of
mootness, the Court stated, "[i]t is well settled that 'a defendant's voluntary cessation
of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice.''' Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 708 (quoting City of Mesquite, 455
U.S. at 289). Furthermore, the defendant that claims voluntary cessation as a way to
mootness "bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear [that] the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not be reasonably expected to recur." [d. at 709.
Consequently, the Court held that Laidlaw's claims for mootness from shutting down
the Roebuck facility and from its substantial compliance earlier, as far as they meet
the above burden, is a "disputed factual matter ... [and] remain[s] open for consideration on remand." [d. at 711.
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Court reasonably found when it assessed a penalty of
$405,800.

447

The Supreme Court's observation, however, ignores the fact
that only $15,100 of the assessed penalty is for current violations. Moreover, while the district court can consider the "history of such violations" for purposes of assessing a current
penalty, there is no statutory authority for the court to assess
penalties for past violations under the citizen suit provisions.448
Nevertheless the Supreme Court, in Laidlaw, clarified its
holding in Steel Co. by recognizing that while "Steel Co. held
that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may
not sue to assess penalties for wholly past violations," Steel Co.
did not address the issue of whether a private plaintiff had
"standing to seek penalties for violations that are ongoing at
the time of the complaint and that could continue into the future if undeterred.~9 As the dissent correctly observed, the
Laidlaw Court thus held "that a penalty payable to the public
"remedies" a threatened private harm, and suffices to sustain a
private suit."'50 Not surprisingly, Laidlaw merely reaffirms
Gwaltney for the holding that "citizens, unlike the Administrator, may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or
otherwise abate an ongoing violation.,,451
On remand, Laidlaw will likely challenge the district court's
subject-matter jurisdiction to award penalties for the past vio-

447

Id. at 707 (citing Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 610-11).

448

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (West 1999). "In determining the amount of a civil penalty
the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic
benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any goodfaith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the
penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require." Id. But see
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco, 2 F.3d 493,503 (3d Cir. 1993) (once
citizen plaintiff establishes ongoing violation of parameter at time complaint is filed,
court is obliged to aSBeSS penalties for all proven violations of that parameter) (emphasis added).
449

450
451

Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 708.

Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
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lations under the citizen suit provisions. "Without jurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is
power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause. ,,452 Subject-matter jurisdiction would
exist, however, for the post-complaint violations and penalty
assessment of $15,100. Moreover, it would behoove the Administrator to intervene to preserve the penalties assessed for
Laidlaw's wholly past violations. 453
Had Laidlaw been brought under the Clean Air Act, the
Court might not have had the opportunity to address the civil
penalties issue. Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, penalties, instead of going to the United States Treasury,
"shall be deposited in a special fund in the United States
Treasury for licensing and other services.,,454 More significantly, the district court in any citizen suit shall have discretion to order that such civil penalties, in lieu of being deposited
in the special fund, "be used in beneficial mitigation projects
which are consistent with this chapter and enhance the public
health or the environment. ,,455 In such situations, a damages
remedy is not paid entirely to the Treasury. Consequently, not
only will the mitigation projects redress the plaintiffs' injuries,
but will render the Article III standing limitations asserted in
Steel Co. inapplicable to Clean Air Act citizen suits. The 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act have thus essentially satisfied Steel Co.'s redressability requirement.
Additionally, under the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air
Act, citizen suits can now be maintained for wholly past viola-

452 Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869».
453 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (West 1999). In such action under this section, the
Administrator, if not a party, may intervene as a matter of right. See id.

454 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(1) (West 1999).
455

42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (West 1999). The court shall obtain the view of the Administrator in exercising such discretion and selecting any such projects. The amount
of any such payment in any such action shall not exceed $100,000. See id.
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tions that have occurred more than once.456 Any limitations
imposed by Gwaltney, Steel Co., or Laidlaw, thus will not apply to citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. If Congress were
so inclined, it could craft similar language into all environmental citizen suit statutes to allow suits for wholly past violations that have occurred more that once, as well as incorporating mitigation projects into the other citizen suit provisions.
C. STATING A CLAIM

Under an equal protection environmental justice claim, to
state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff must
allege that some person, acting under state or territorial law,
has deprived him of a federal right. 457 Presumably, the advocate will allege discriminatory intent on the part of the defendants, as this element will need to be proven at trial. Similarly, under Title VI "[t]o state a claim for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity
involved is receiving federal assistance. ,,458 "Although the
plaintiff must prove intent at trial, it need not be pled in the
complaint. ,,459
Under the citizen suit provisions, the plaintiff will need to
allege "a state of either continuous or intermittent violation;
that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will con-

456 42 U.S.C. § 7604(aXl) (West 1999). A civil action may be brought against any
person "who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation
has been repeated)." [d. See also Fried v. Sungard Recovery Services, Inc. 916 F.
Supp. 465, 467 (E.n. Pa. 1996). "A plain reading of the CAA as amended, however,
indicates that the 1990 Amendments overruled Gwaltney with respect to wholly past
violations. The CAA, therefore, permits citizen suits for both continuing violations and
wholly past violation, 80 long as the past violation occurred more than once." [d.

457

See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

456 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
459 [d.
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tinue to pollute in the future.,,460 Under the federal laws, a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
"unless it appears beyond doubt that "the plaintiff can prove no
461
set of facts" in support of the claim. For example, in Scheuer
v. Rhodes,462 the Court held that for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the allegations in the complaint are taken as true,
even when they "have not yet [been] established by proof.,,463
Thus, an environmental justice claim should withstand a motion to dismiss if properly pled because even defective allegations in a complaint can be amended to correct any pleading
errors. 464
D. TIMELY FILING

The advocate should file the case within the applicable
statute of limitations. For an equal protection challenge filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the limitations period is
the one found in the particular state's personal-injury
statute. 465 For claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, a number of circuit courts have held that such claims brought are
governed by the same state limitations period. 466 Consequently,
the state in which an equal protection challenge or Title VI
action is filed will govern the time within which to file the action. A Title VI administrative complaint, however, "must be
filed within 180 calendar days of the alleged discriminatory

460 Gwaltney, 484 u.s. at 57. Section "505 confers jurisdiction over citizen suits
when the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent
violation." [d. at 64.

461
462
463
464

465

•

Conley v. GIbson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957).
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
[d. at 238.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 15(a); 28 U.S.C.A § 1653 (West 1999).

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,276 (1985).

466 See Taylor v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993); Frazier
v. Garrison I.S.C., 980 F.2d 1514, 1520-22 (5th Cir. 1993); Bougher v. University of
Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989); Chambers v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 536
F.2d 222, 225 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976).
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acts, unless the OCR waives the time limit for good cause.,,467
With regard to a complaint under the Administrative Procedure Act, numerous courts have held that it is a "civil action"
within the meaning of the Tucker Act,468 which contains the
general six-year statute of limitations.
E.S~YJUDGMENT

An environmental justice action filed under either the

Equal Protection Clause or Title VI should withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment. The reason for this is
that in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Court recognized that "the
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.,,469 "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will [thus] not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment [since] the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. ,,470
A fact is material when it is identified as such by the controlling substantive law.471 In an environmental justice case,
"whether the differential impact ... reflect[s] an intent to discriminate on account of race, . . . is a pure question of fact.,,472
Similarly, an issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. 473
Accordingly, the nonmovant "must do more than simply show

467

40 C.F.R. § 7.120(bX2) (1999).

468 28 U.S.C. § 1491. "[E]very civil action commenced against the United States
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action
first accrues." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (West 1999). See also Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d
623, 630-31 (6th Cir. 1997).
469

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317,322 (1986) (emphasis added).

470 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247-48 (1986) (emphasis added).
471

S ee id . at 248.

472 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982).
473 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
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that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .
. . [for w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
'genuine issue for trial.' ,,474
Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the advocate, after discovery, must come forward with specific evidence
of every element material to the case so as to create a genuine
issue for trial. The evidence of disparate impact, together with
supplemental circumstantial evidence should create this
genuine issue of material fact for the trial court. For example,
in R.l.S.E. Inc. v. Kay;76 the evidence of disproportionate impact on black residents by the placement of landfills in King
and Queen County for twenty-five years beginning in 1969,
together with the historical facts revealing a pattern of official
actions taken for invidious purposes, could lead a rational trier
of fact to the conclusion that there was a violation of the Equal
476
Protection Clause.

F.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In general, government defendants do not like to be sued.
Thus, in an environmental justice action under the Equal Protection Clause, the government defendants will most likely
assert sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
While it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment will bar a damages claim against state officials sued in their official capacity,
it will not, however, bar a damages claim against state officials
sued in their personal capacity.477 When this is done, state officials can assert "personal immunity defenses, s:uch as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.,,478 However, while

474

Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87

(1986).

476

768 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd without opinion, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.

1992).

476 See id. at 1143.
477
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
478

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985).
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most public officials are entitled to assert qualified immunity
as a personal, affirmative defense to a damage liability, it does
not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief. ,,479
In an official capacity, however, the Supreme Court has
held, in Kentucky v. Graham,48O that "personal immunity defenses are unavailable. [Consequently, t]he only immunities
that can be claimed ... are forms of sovereign immunity that
the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh
Amendment.,,481 Similarly, in Howlett v. Rose,482 the Court recognized that "since municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are 'persons,' . . . a state court entertaining
a [section] 1983 action ... [has] abolished whatever vestige of
the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.,,4i13
Thus, the County Board of Supervisors of San Franjustco
County484 could be sued in an official-capacity action filed under section 1983. Local government officials are also "persons"
under section 1983 when sued in their official capacities. As
such, they are suable in those cases in which the local govern485
ment would be suable it its own name. Consequently, local
governments and their officials "can be sued directly under
[section] 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
officers.,,486 In the hypothetical, then, San Franjustco County
could be sued in its own name for monetary, declaratory, or
injunctive relief because the municipality is a "person" under
section 1983. Moreover, San Franjustco County could not as-

479

480
481
482

483
484

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-807 (1982).

473 U.S. 159 (1985).

ld. at 167.
496 U.S. 356 (1990).
ld. at 376.
See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text for examples.

485 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978).
486

ld. at 690.
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sert any sovereign immunity defense because "[t]he bar of the
Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts ... does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.,,487
The major distinction of an environmental justice claim
filed under Title VI, as opposed to section 1983, is that Congress explicitly abrogated the states' immunity from suits in
federal court alleging violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.488 Significantly, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2) provides,
In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies
both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available
for such a violation in the suit against any public or pri489
vate entity other than ~ State.
Such an abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity "similarly precludes assertion of immunity by state officials sued in their official capacity."'oo The Eleventh Amendment is thus not a bar to a private cause of action for damages,
as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, under a Title VI
suit, against state and local agencies receiving federal funds.
Such remedies could compensate a minority community for
decreased land values, aesthetics, and the risks to the health
491
and safety of its inhabitants.
G. EQUITABLE RELIEF

Equitable claims are generally decided by the district court.
However, "when both parties consent, [Federal Rule of Civil

487

Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).

488 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (West 1999) (added by the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845 (1986».
489
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2).
490
491

Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 452 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677, affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir.

1986).
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Procedure ("FRCP")] 39(c) invests the trial court with the discretion - - but not the duty - - to submit an equitable claim to
the jury for a binding verdict. ",,92 As the Supreme Court has
recognized the legal action for a damages remedy under the
Equal Protection Clause493 and Title VI,494 the advocate should
demand a jury trial on the issue of discriminatory intent. This
demand is an affirmative duty as, established by FRCP 38(b),
thus, "the failure to file a demand constitutes a waiver of the
right.""96 Such a demand was made in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v.
Westover, where the Supreme Court held that, per the FRCP,
the same court may try both legal and equitable causes in the
same action. . . . Whatever permanent injunctive relief [the
plaintiffs] might be entitled to on the basis of the decision in
this case could, of course, be given by the court after the jury
renders its verdict.""96 This allows all issues between two parties to be fully settled by a jury in a single suit!97 The environmental justice advocate thus is entitled to a jury trial on
the issue of intent under the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VI. Injunctive relief, however, should await determination of
the legal issues.
H. ATrORNEY FEES

Under section 1983 or Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides,
in part, that in an enforcement of a section 1983 violation,
brought by or on behalf of the government, or in an enforcement or charge of a Title VI violation, "the court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United

492

Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994).

493

See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

494 See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992). See also
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191 (1996) (citing Franklin for the interpretation that a
"clear ml\iority" of the Court in Guardians confirmed that damages were available for
intentional violations of Title VI).
496

See Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1995).

497

Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) (emphasis added).
See id.

496
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States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costS.,,498 Section 1988 would thus seem to include fees under Title VI ad- .
ministrative proceedings as well. In comparison, attorney fees
under the federal environmental statutes are authorized under
the various citizen suit provisions. 499
VI.

CONCLUSION

Environmental justice cases alleging purposeful discrimination must be tried before a jury. A jury composed of a representative community of color will see to it that no subgroup of
people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of
the negative environmental impacts of pollution or environmental hazards due to lack of political or economic strength. In
a purposeful discrimination case, Title VI should prove to be a
slightly better vehicle than section 1983, as Congress has expressly abrogated the states Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Under Title VI and section 1983, damages, as well as injunctive relief, should be sought.
Under Title VI regulations, the environmental justice advocate must first exhaust any administrative complaint procedures. While up to now, those procedures have not provided
any measurable relief to communities of color, EPA's Final
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
may offer some relief. Relief may also be available, in the form
of a judicial review of an agency decision, under the Administrative Procedure Act in federal district court. While only equitable relief is available under the APA, sovereign immunity of
the federal agencies is expressly waived. In comparison, citizen
suits under federal environmental statutes should prove more
effective when Congress amends the citizen suit provisions, as

498
499

Maine, 448 U.S. at 9.
•

See, e.g., TOXIC Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(cX2) (West 1999); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (West 1999); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300j-8(d) (West 1999); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (West 1999);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (West 1999); Emergency Planning and Community
Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(0 (West 1999).
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it did with the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, to allow suits
for wholly past violations.
The environmental justice movement is a most worthy
challenge that will benefit all of us. As Robert Bullard has recognized, "[a]s important as distributional equity is in the environmental justice movement, equal pollution or equal risk is
not the final objective. The environmental justice framework
embodies the right of all individuals to be protected from environmental hazards.,,500

500 Robert D. Bullard, Unequal Environmental Protection: Incorporatino Environmental Justice in Decision Makino, in WORST THINGS F'IRsT?: THE DEBATE OVER RISK

BASED NATIONAL PRIORITIES at 243 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994)
(emphasis added).
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